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ABSTRACT
Comparative Analysis of Casino Operations 
on the Las Vegas Strip and in Atlantic City
by
Jae-H ong Kim
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee C hair 
Professor o f Hotel Administration 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
The main purpose o f  this study is to assess the state o f the casino industry within 
the respective markets o f  Atlantic City and the Las Vegas Strip, based on recent changes 
in their financial perform ances. It attempts to  identify trends in revenue, cost, and profit 
margin o f the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic C ity casinos since 1995, when the gaming 
market saturation was not a  problem. Casino performances within these two markets are 
compared. To achieve this objective, aggregate data o f 37 casinos on the Las Vegas Strip 
and 12 casinos in Atlantic City are used.
Despite fast rising revenues on the Las Vegas Strip, total operating costs and 
expenses have increased more quickly than has total revenue. This has caused a decline 
in net income before income taxes and extraordinary items since 1996 (Nevada G am ing 
Abstract, 1995 — 2CXX)). Primary contributors to declining profit margins on the Las 
Vegas Strip are significant increases in o ther general and adm inistrative expenses; 
management fees; corporation fees; internal maintenance fees, interest expenses, and
III
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depreciation and amortization, especially in 1999 and 2000, during w hich several new 
hote 1-casinos opened.
In A tlantic City, a  fierce marketing war took place consisting o f  bus and coin 
giveaway packages in 1996 (Rutherford, 1999), which significantly affected the increase 
o f total operating costs and expenses, as well as a  decline in the bottom -line profit margin 
for the year. Since then, Atlantic City casinos have generated declining ratios in total cost 
and expense and correspondingly increased profit margins as a  percentage o f  total 
revenue.
In com paring financial performances o f large casinos with those o f  small casinos 
on the Las Vegas Strip and in Atlantic City, it appears large casinos enjoyed an obvious 
cost advantage with significantly lower costs and expenses in both markets, due to 
economies o f  scale. Because o f  this obvious cost advantage, large casinos had much 
higher net incomes before income taxes and extraordinary items than did small casinos.
An exam ination o f trends and stability o f win revenues o f slots versus table games 
in Atlantic C ity and on the Las Vegas Strip respectively showed that two m ajor slots, 
quarter slots in particular, on the Las Vegas Strip had a  higher revenue grow th trend and 
more stabilized win revenues than did two major table games. In A tlantic City, aggregate 
slot win revenues also had a significantly higher growth trend and m ore stabilized win 
revenues than did aggregate table win revenues.
IV
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background o f  the Study 
The gaming industry has been among the strongest growth industries in America. 
O ver the last three decades, the United States has gone from having one state with 
legalized commercial casinos and a few states with pari-mutuel wagering o r charitable 
bingo to being a country with legalized gam bling in 48 out o f  its 50 states. The National 
Gam bling Impact Study Com m ission reports that gross revenues from all U.S. gam bling 
sources, wagers minus payouts, exceeded $50 billion in 1997 (Demaree, 2000).
Among the different gambling enterprises, casinos have experienced the fastest 
growth rate in terms o f revenues. For many years, Nevada has had a  m onopoly on legal 
commercial casino gambling in the United States. New Jersey permitted casino gam bling 
beginning in 1978, Iowa and South Dakota in 1990; and six other states have authorized 
commercial casinos since (Christiansen &  Cum m ings, 1997). Commercial casinos won 
about $22.2 billion from players in 1999; $19.1 billion in 1996; and $8.9 billion in 1991. 
O ne report shows that 30 percent o f  U.S. households visited a casino in 1999, m aking an 
average o f  5.4 trips in the year (Davis, 2001 ).
Casino and other types o f  gambling on Indian reservations have also spread 
quickly across the country as a  result o f  the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act o f  1988. As
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o f  February 1997, 142 contracts had been negotiated for Indian gaming, with estimated 
revenues o f  as much as $5.4 billion in 1996. The rapid expansion o f riverboat gaming and 
gaming on Indian lands changed the industry dram atically, especially in view o f the rapid 
proliferation o f gaming destinations and opportunities (Christiansen & Cummings, 1997).
During the past 20 years. Las Vegas has experienced an unprecedented period o f 
growth, primarily as a  result o f  gaming’s increased popularity. Virtually all published 
statistics on gaming’s role in the Las Vegas econom y demonstrate a solid upward trend 
from the late 1970s to today, including gaming revenue, number o f  hotel rooms, visitor 
aixivals, and slot machine wins (McGhie Consulting, 1996). According to Gu ( 1998), 
during the mid-1990s, while most gaming m arkets in the United States felt the pain 
caused by overcapacity and competition. Las V egas, an oasis in the desert and haven for 
casino operators, was luckily immune from such m arket hardships.
In 1999, Nevada casinos generated revenue o f $8.5 billion, a 7.9% gain from 
1998, and the strongest growth in five years. According to the Nevada State Gaming 
Control Board, the opening o f the Bellagio in O ctober 1998; the M andalay Bay in March 
1999; the Venetian in May 1999; and the Paris in September 1999, gave casinos their best 
fiscal year since 1994.
Today, however, with the ongoing construction of more new mega-resorts along 
Las Vegas Boulevard, nicknamed “The Strip”, such good fortune may no longer continue 
uninterrupted. According to the Las Vegas Review Journal (Vogel, 2001), the Nevada 
Resort Association released a report showing that gaming profits have fallen dramatically 
since 1997. The report further states that, in Nevada, gaming profits fell from about $1.4 
billion in 1997 to $500 million in 2000. Profits o f  Nevada gaming in 2000 were about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
$280 m illion below Nevada’s 1999 figures. Profits for the Strip properties dropped from 
$ l billion in 1997 to $200 million in 2000. Coupled with the reality o f this decline is the 
fact that the gaming industry now also faces increased competition from Indian casinos in 
Arizona, California, and else where.
Table I shows that Las Vegas Strip gaming revenue, as a percentage o f  total 
revenue, has been declining since 1995, even though recent gaming revenues on the Las 
Vegas Strip have been significantly increasing. Ratios o f EBITDA to total revenue have 
also gradually decreased since 1996. Ratios o f  net income to total revenue have decreased 
as well since then, including a  significant decline in 2000, from 6.3 percent o f  total 
revenue in 1999 to 1.8 percent o f  total revenue in 2000, although total gam ing revenue 
increased by 13.3 percent in 2000.
Table I
Las Vegas Strip Gaming Revenues and Primarv Ratios to Total Revenue
Gaming 
Revenue 
(S in billion)
Gaming Revenue 
to Total Revenue
(%)
EBITDA 
to Total Revenue 
(%)
Net Income 
to Total Revenue
(%)
1995 3.52 53.8 21.1 11.7
1996 3.63 52.9 22.6 14.2
1997 3.65 51.5 21.0 12.8
1998 3.72 50.3 20.3 10.9
1999 4.13 48.1 18.7 6.3
2000 4.68 45.9 17.1 1.8
Note. From “N evada Gaming Abstract,” by Nevada State Gaming Control Board 
(1995-2000).
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According to Nevada Gam ing Abstract ( 1995 — 2000), Las Vegas Strip casinos 
with annual gam ing revenue o f  $1 million to $72 millions have seen each year net loss in 
operating their casinos since 1995, slightly offsetting the net income of overall Las Vegas 
Strip casinos. In 2000, on the Las Vegas Strip, the aggregate 15 casinos with annual 
gaming revenues o f $1 million to $72 million generated a  net loss o f $129 m illion, while 
the aggregate 22 casinos with annual gaming revenues o f  $72 million and over generated 
a net income o f  $315 million.
G u ( 1999) noted that large casinos (22 casinos with annual gaming revenue o f 
$72 million and over) on the Las Vegas Strip are generally more efficient than sm all 
casinos (15 casinos with annual gaming revenue o f $1 m illion to $72 millions) in using 
human resources and assets to generate revenue. The large casinos also enjoy an obvious 
cost advantage, with overall low er cost o f  sales and lower labor cost.
According to the Christiansen & Cummings Association Report (1991), the 
spread o f  casino gaming across North America will, over tim e, tend to impose ceiling 
pressures on Atlantic C ity’s market demand. In the more competitive gaming 
marketplace o f  the future Atlantic City, casinos will need to make ongoing capital 
improvements to keep facilities competitive with increased consumer expectations o f the 
overall experiences casino/hotel resorts are expected to provide.
Table 2 shows that the gam ing revenue o f Atlantic C ity has continuously 
increased since 1995, and that gaming revenues as a percentage o f total revenue have 
consistently been at 80 — 82 percent o f  total revenue. This table also illustrates that, after 
experiencing a significant drop o f  EBITDA and net income in 1996, 12 casinos in 
Atlantic C ity have generated an increased EBITDA and net income as a  percentage o f
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total revenue since then (except for a  significant decline in those items in 1999). In 2000, 
EBITDA and net income o f  Atlantic City casinos were, respectively, 17.2 percent o f  total 
revenue and 2.8 percent o f total revenue.
Table 2
Atlantic C itv Gaming Revenues and Primarv Ratios to Total Revenue
Gaming 
Revenue 
(S in billion)
Gaming Revenue 
to Total Revenue
(%)
EBITDA 
to Total Revenue 
(%)
Net Income 
to Total Revenue 
(%)
1995 3.74 82.1 18.7 4.5
1996 3.80 81.3 14.6 0.4
1997 3.86 81.0 15.7 1.9
1998 3.98 80.9 16.5 2.3
1999 4.10 81.2 13.1 (1.8)
2000 4.22 81.6 17.2 2.8
Note. From “Annual Report,” by State o f New Jersey Casino Control Commission 
(1995-2000).
During the first four m onths o f  2001. the gaming revenue o f Atlantic City casinos 
was $1.4 billion, 1.1 percent behind the previous year’s pace, raising the possibility that 
the industry could finish 2001 with negative growth for the first time in its 23-year 
history. Slot machine revenue, which accounts for nearly three-fourths o f casino business, 
is, however, presently 1.1 percent ahead o f last year’s pace. It is table games revenue, 
which has declined 6.7 percent, that currently hurts most (W einert, 2001).
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Purposes o f  the Study 
The purpose o f  the study is to assess the state o f the casino industry in two major 
markets; the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City. It attempts to identify trends in revenue, 
cost, and profit margin on the Las Vegas Strip and in Atlantic City casinos since 1995, 
when gaming market saturation was not a  problem. Casino performances within the two 
gaming markets will be compared. Furthermore, this study will investigate operations o f 
large casinos versus small casinos in the two markets. Finally, win revenues o f four major 
games on the Las Vegas Strip and slots and table games in Atlantic C ity will be examined 
in terms o f trends and stability.
The Sub-Problems 
The First Sub-Problem 
The first sub-problem is to identify trends in revenue, cost, and profit margin 
among Las Vegas Strip casinos overall in terms o f  vertical and horizontal analysis o f  
aggregate income statements. By analyzing trends in revenue, cost, profit, and revenue 
per unit o f slot and table games on the Las Vegas Strip, this study attem pts to ascertain 
reasons why profit margins have steadily declined on the Las Vegas Strip since 1995.
The Second Sub-Problem 
The second sub-problem is to exam ine trends in revenue, cost, and profit margin 
o f Atlantic City casinos overall using vertical and horizontal analysis o f  aggregate 
income statements. By analyzing trends in revenue, cost, profit margin, and revenue per 
unit o f  slot and table gam es in Atlantic City, this study attempts to find reasons for the 
dramatic decline and recovery o f Atlantic City casinos’ profitability.
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The Third Sub-Problem 
The third sub-problem  is to compare trends in casino operations w ithin Atlantic 
C ity and on the Las Vegas Strip in terms o f revenue, cost, profit margin, and revenue per 
unit o f  slot and table games. Through this analysis, this study investigates differences in 
financial performance between Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos, and the 
reasons for those differences.
The Fourth Sub-Problem 
The fourth sub-problem is to compare financial performances between small and 
large casinos on the Las Vegas Strip and in Atlantic City, in terms o f com parative 
analysis o f vertical income statements, ratios, and revenue per unit o f  slot and table 
games. The study also investigates whether there are economies o f scale w ithin the casino 
industry.
The Fifth Sub-Problem 
Finally, the fifth sub-problem o f  this study is to examine win revenues o f some 
m ajor games on the Las Vegas Strip, and o f slot and table games in Atlantic City, in 
terms o f trends and stability. Through this examination, the study will investigate how to 
both increase and stabilize within the casino industry.
Contributions o f the Study 
The results o f  this study can help investors, creditors, and gaming managers to 
understand the current status and future o f the gaming industry in the two m ajor U.S. 
casino markets; Atlantic City and the Las Vegas Strip. The analysis may also lead to
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8some suggestions for casinos for reducing total costs and expenses, as well as for 
improving profit margins.
Delimitations o f the Study 
For its comparison o f  two major gaming markets, this study selected Las Vegas 
Strip and Atlantic City casinos only. In deciding on a specific market to com pare with 
Atlantic City, this study selected the Las Vegas Strip casinos. There are specific reasons 
why the researcher selected these two markets in particular.
M ost importantly, the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City casinos are the oldest and 
largest casino destinations within the U.S. gaming industry. Nevada had in fact been the 
only state with legalized casino gaming before New Jersey began allowing it in 1978. 
Atlantic City, the world’s second largest casino gaming destination after Las Vegas, 
experienced tremendous growth in terms o f revenues and visitor popularity throughout 
the late I970’s and I980’s.
The tremendous growth o f Atlantic City casinos has lead Atlantic City to com pare 
itself with the Las Vegas Strip in terms o f  gaming revenue and visitor popularity. Also, 
both gaming markets are highly concentrated in one spot, and their prim ary targets are 
tourists. Finally, the reason the researcher selected Atlantic City and the Las Vegas Strip 
is that these two casino jurisdictions have more available data than do any others.
Limitations o f the Study 
Secondary data are the only sources used within this study. One limitation o f the 
study has to do with the consistency o f required financial data used in the vertical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
analysis o f  aggregate income statements o f the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic C ity  casinos. 
Since each market’s aggregate income statement has different categories and items, the 
researcher has adjusted some items on the Las Vegas S trip’s aggregate incom e statements 
to facilitate a comparative vertical analysis o f  Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City casinos. 
Another limitation o f the study has to do with changes in accounting m ethods o f  Nevada 
casinos during 2000, which affected the decline in net incom e before income taxes and 
extraordinary items o f Las Vegas Strip casinos during 2000.
Definition of Terms
1. Las Vegas Strip casinos. Hotel-casinos along Las Vegas Boulevard, Las Vegas, 
Nevada. These represent 37 hotel-casinos with annual gaming revenues o f  SI million 
and over in 2000.
2. Atlantic Citv casinos. Hotel-casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. These represent 12 
hotel-casinos in Atlantic City in 2000.
3. Small casinos in Atlantic C itv. Hotel-casinos with annual gaming revenues o f less 
than $400 million in Atlantic City in 2000. Seven (7) hotel-casinos fit this category.
4. Large casinos in Atlantic C itv. Hotel-casinos with annual gaming revenues o f  $400 
million and over in Atlantic City in 2000. Five (5) hotel-casinos fit this category.
5. Small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip. Hotel-casinos w ith annual gam ing revenues o f 
$1 million to $72 million on the Las Vegas Strip in 2000. Fifteen (15) hotel-casinos 
fit this category.
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6. Large casinos on the Las V esas S trip . Hotel-casinos with annual gaming revenues o f 
$72 m illion and over on the Las Vegas Strip in 2000. Twenty-two (22) hotel-casinos 
fit this category.
7. Economies o f  Scale. Economies o f  scale exist if  a firm achieves unit-cost savings as it 
increases its production o f a given good or service. In other words, firms achieve 
econom ies o f  scale when operating costs increase at a lower rate than output.
8. Vertical Analvsis. Vertical analysis focuses on financial relationships in a single 
period’s financial statements rather than on dollar and percentage changes in financial 
statem ent items over time (as does horizontal analysis). Each item on an incom e 
statem ent is expressed as a  percentage o f total revenue.
9. Horizontal Analvsis. Horizontal analysis, also called index-number trend analysis, 
focuses on changes in accounting information from period to period. This type o f 
analysis indicates whether a com pany’s sales, gross profit, expenses, and net income 
are increasing or decreasing over time, as well as the am ount o f change in each o f 
these item s from the previous year.
10. Trend Analvsis. Trend analysis is a form o f horizontal analysis using com parative 
financial statements for more than two successive periods. In this study, trend 
analysis exam ines trends in particular ratios to determ ine whether that ratio is falling, 
rising, o r remaining relatively constant.
11. Table W in/Unit/Dav. Daily win per table, table win/unit/day, is analyzed to see the 
efficiency o f  operating table games. It is calculated for both Atlantic City casinos and 
Las Vegas Strip casinos by dividing total table wins by num ber o f  table units, then 
dividing this number by 365.
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12. Slot W in/Unit/Dav. Daily win per slot, slot win/unit/day, is analyzed to determine 
efficiency o f  operating slots. It is calculated for both Atlantic C ity casinos and Las 
Vegas Strip casinos by dividing total slot wins by number o f  slot units, then dividing 
this num ber by 365.
13. Ratio Analvsis. This is the comparison o f  related facts and figures. Ratio analysis is 
used to evaluate favorableness or unfavorableness of various financial conditions. In 
this study, ratio analysis is used only to identify financial differences between large 
and small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip.
Organization o f  the Study 
The main purpose o f this study is to assess the state o f  the casino industry in two 
major U.S. markets; the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City. Casino performance in these 
two gaming markets will be compared. C hapter 1 provides a  background o f  the study, 
including the purpose o f the study, sub-problems, contribution, delim itations, limitations 
o f the study, and definitions o f terms. C hapter 2 reviews the literature on overall U.S. 
gaming markets, the current gaming industry, and previous studies on the gaming 
industry. Chapter 3 discusses data collection and research m ethodology used in this study. 
Chapter 4 reports the study’s results and findings, in terms o f  the descriptive analysis and 
empirical exam ination. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study, discussing implications o f 
its results and findings, as well as offering suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW O F RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction
The previous chapter provided the background, the purpose o f study, and briefly 
discussed casino operations in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip. Since the main 
purpose o f this study is to assess and compare the state o f  the casino industry in two 
m ajor markets, Atlantic City and the Las Vegas Strip, in terms o f revenue, cost, profit 
margin, and revenue per unit o f  slot and table games, this chapter covers related literature 
on casino operations, focusing on casino financial perform ance in particular. In its 
overview  o f previous studies, this study reviews overall U.S. gaming markets, focusing 
on the major gaming destinations o f  Atlantic City and the Las Vegas Strip, as well as the 
current U.S. gaming industry overall. This chapter also reviews literature on income 
statem ent analysis; ratio analysis; and economies o f  scale. The chapter is organized in the 
following o rd er
1. Overview o f previous studies
2. Income Statement analysis
3. Ratio analysis
4. Economies o f Scale.
12
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Overview o f Previous Studies 
U.S. Gaming Markets 
Casino gaming, long relegated to a prohibited status, has become one o f  the most 
rapidly growing and changing industries in the world. O ver the past two decades, 
legalization and expansion o f  casinos has occurred in countries on almost every continent. 
Furthermore, nearly every jurisdiction has approached the casino issue in a different way, 
leading to a  wide spectrum o f regulatory and market structures, ranging from highly 
com petitive industries to legislated monopolies, from government ownership to private 
enterprise, and from heavily regulated and taxed industries to laissez faire operations 
(Eadington, 1994).
Until the mid-1970s, Nevada was the only state in U.S. that allowed casino 
operations. In 1976, New Jersey voters authorized the developm ent o f a casino in 
Atlantic City, which began operations in 1978. Atlantic City has since grown to be the 
second largest casino destination in U.S., which was measured in grow gaming revenues, 
behind only Las Vegas (Dom brink &  Thompson, 1989).
Atlantic City, New Jersey, the world’s second largest casino gaming destination, 
experienced tremendous growth in terms o f revenues and visitor popularity throughout 
the late 1970’s and 1980’s with peak visitation o f 33 million in 1988. However, from the 
late 1980s onward, the growth in Atlantic City revenues declined from the previous 
stellar performances and slow ed to a crawl. The decline in casino revenue growth can be 
attributed to a  num ber o f reasons; however, the foremost cause o f  this recent slowdown 
was the expansion and legalization o f  casino gaming across America. Prior to 1991, 
Atlantic City had an absolute monopoly o f  legal casino gaming on the East Coast with
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the only domestic competition com ing from the gaming capital o f  the world. Las Vegas, 
N evada (Lowenhar, Repsher & Taylor, 1999).
Until 1989, legal operating casinos in the U.S. could only be found in N evada and 
in Atlantic City, New Jersey. However, between 1989 and 1995, legal casinos cam e into 
existence in more than 20 additional states, appealing in a  variety o f forms and hybrids. 
These new jurisdictions included smal 1-stakes casinos, casinos in mining tow ns, riverboat 
casinos, Indian casinos and urban casinos (Eadington, 1998).
According to the American Gaming Association’s first annual survey o f  casino 
industry facts and public perceptions ( 1999), the commercial gaming industry had gross 
revenues in 1998 o f approximately S20 billion through about 450 properties in the U.S. 
The commercial casino industry paid more than $2.5 billion in direct gaming tax 
revenues and employed more than 325,000 people with total wages o f $8.7 billion in 
1998, playing a key role in the economies o f the ten states with casinos.
The Current Gaming Industrv 
According to Bear Steam s & Co (2000), land-based, riverboat, and Native 
American casinos in the U.S. generated approximately $29.9 billion in revenues in 1999. 
This represents an increase o f approximately 10.9 percent from revenues o f  $26.6 billion 
in 1998. This $3.3 billion increase in revenues resulted from strong growth in the 
traditional markets, as well as regulatory relief in several o f  the riverboat m arkets.
Table 7 shows the total gaming revenues o f  the U.S. by jurisdiction since 1997. 
The N evada casino industry in 2000 lost its position as the top revenue producing gaming 
market in the country when its $9.6 billion in winnings were surpassed by the $9.9 billion 
won by tribal casinos. Riverboat gaming revenue is projected to grow by 6 percent in
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2001, reaching $9.9 billion, while Nevada winnings are expected to increase 2 percent to 
$9.8 billion. According to the Las Vegas Review Journal (Simpson, 2001), M errill Lynch 
estim ates that tribal casino revenue will grow by 29 percent in 2001 to 12.2 billion. If the 
tribal and riverboat figures are divided into geographic markets scattered throughout the 
U.S., N evada’s total far outdistances those o f other jurisdictions. Las Vegas Strip casinos 
won $4.9 billion and Atlantic City casinos earned $4.3 billion in 2000, while M ississippi, 
w ith $2.7 billion in casino winnings, generated the largest revenues o f  all riverboat states.
Table 3
Total Gam ing Revenues o f  the U.S. bv Jurisdiction
Nevada Las Vegas Strip Atlantic City Riverboat Tribal Casinos' Total U.S.3
1997 $7.8 $3.8 $3.9 $6.4 $5.8 $24.7
1998 8.1 3.8 4.0 7.3 7.9 28.1
1999 9.0 4.5 4.2 8.3 8.4 31.1
2000 9.6 4.9 4.3 9.3 9.9 35.1
200 IE ' 9.8 4.9 4.4 9.9 12.2 38.4
Note. From “Merrill Lynch. ” Revenues are in billions o f  dollars.
1. 2001 numbers are Merrill Lynch estimates. 2. Tribal casino figures are M errill Lynch 
estim ates. M ost tribes do not release revenue numbers. 3. Total U.S. figures include all 
listed locations, plus Colorado, Delaware, Detroit and South Dakota.
Growth o f gaming revenue has been achieved through the industry’s rapid 
expansion into traditional markets and recent penetration into new markets. In the past 
several years, the industry has experienced a remarkable increase in new gam ing facilities, 
such as mega resorts, riverboat, and/or dockside casinos, and (especially) Indian 
reservation casinos, the industry’s fastest growing sector. However, the nationwide 
gam ing boom  has not warranted high profits for all gam ing operations (Gu, 1997).
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According to Gu (1997), despite the expansion o f new facilities and the opening 
o f  new mega-casinos, riverboats, and Indian casinos, it appears that grow th in gaming has 
slowed, and com petition has become more intense in an industry that has likely reached 
saturation. In 1995, m any riverboats along the Mississippi River had a  difficult year. 
W hile market saturation in emerging markets was a main factor that contributed to lower- 
than-expected profitability among many casino operators, other factors, such as 
environmental concerns and high local gaming taxes, also had negative effects on profits.
Chang (1995) developed a regression model to predict the m aturity point in 
gaming revenues o f  casinos located in Harrison County, M ississippi. O nce a gaming 
reaches maturity, further growth is still possible and even probable, but at greater cost. It 
appears that the casino industry on the G ulf Coast o f  Mississippi reached maturity in
1994. Since then, it has experienced pains o f competition, caused by local casinos and 
new riverboat casinos in Louisiana.
Destinations offering the same kinds o f gaming activity com pete with each other. 
Schonkwiler (1993) show ed that Atlantic City casinos had a negative effect on the 
Nevada casino industry. First, Schonkwiler noted that while num bers o f  visitors to Las 
Vegas increased dram atically between the mid-1970s and the m id-1980s, numbers o f 
visitors to Las Vegas from the eastern United States declined 44 percent during this 
period. Second, Schonkw iler developed a  dynamic unobserved-components model to 
estim ate impact o f  A tlantic City casinos on Nevada taxable gam ing revenue. By 1985, 
the competition offered by Atlantic City appeared to result in an annual reduction in 
Nevada taxable gam ing revenue o f between 10 and 12 percent. A tlantic City casinos were
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most competitive with Nevada casinos during the third quarter and least competitive 
during the first quarter.
The current gaming industry, as it pertains to the four m ajor casino jurisdictions in 
the U.S., will be discussed in this chapter as follows: riverboat gaming; Indian reservation 
gaming; Las Vegas Strip gaming; and Atlantic C ity gaming.
Riverboat Gaming
Riverboat casinos were begun in Iowa in 1989, to help overcome a serious 
economic depression in that area, and have spread throughout the Mississippi River 
drainage basin ever since. Illinois and M ississippi soon legalized riverboat gaming, and 
Louisiana, Indiana, and Missouri were not far behind (Hsu, 2(XX)). According to Fockler
(1999), in 1997, a  disparate fleet o f some 70 riverboat casinos had combined gaming 
wins o f S6.2 billion, much on par with overall gaming wins in Las Vegas. Mississippi has 
21 casinos, split between G ulf Coast anchorages and Tunica County on the Mississippi 
River. Louisiana has 13 boats; Missouri has ten; and Indiana and Iowa each have nine.
Casinos in Illinois, Indiana, M issouri, and Iowa generated combined revenues o f 
approximately $4.7 billion in 1999, a 15.4 percent increase over 1998. Also, casinos in 
Louisiana and Mississippi, where there are gam ing jurisdictions in the Southeast, 
generated combined revenues o f $3.9 billion in 1999, an approximate 12.9 percent 
increase since 1998, with Mississippi generating $2.5 billion, 64 percent o f  the total 
Southern region revenues, while Louisiana generated $1.4 billion in revenues (Bears, 
Steams &  Co, 2000).
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Indian Reservation Gaming
In 1999, tribal operations earned an estimated $8 billion in annual revenues. 
Federal officials estimate that 157 tribes are involved in casino gam ing, with 197 gaming 
contracts in 1999. From 1988 to 1997, gam ing revenues to tribes increased from $212 
million to $6.7 billion, a more than thirty fold increase. By com parison, non-Indian 
casino gaming roughly doubled over the same period. The num ber o f  tribal casinos or 
bingo halls operating on Indian reservations increased from 70 in 1988 to 298 in 1998 in 
31 states. In 1998, o f the 554 federally recognized Indian tribes, 146 ran gaming facilities 
(M iller & Association, Inc., 20CX)).
The 20 largest Indian casinos and bingo halls accounted for 50.5 percent o f total 
tribal gambling revenues in 1998, with the next 85 accounting for 41.2 percent. A few 
Indian casinos are enormously lucrative, including the $ 1 billion per year Foxwoods run 
by the M ashantucket Pequot tribe in Connecticut. Foxwoods paid Connecticut more than 
$150 million in 1999; the state receives 25 percent o f the slot m achine revenue. Indian 
casinos are sovereign nations, and as such are not required to pay federal or state taxes. In 
general, they face less stringent regulations than non-Indian gam ing facilities. Taxes are 
determined by the contract negotiated with the state (Miller & Association, Inc., 2CXX)).
Excluding gaming on Indian lands, casinos were in operation in 10 states at the 
end o f 1996. Nevada and Atlantic City, the traditional centers o f  gravity, still accounted 
forclose to two-thirds o f  nationwide gaming revenue in 1996. Nevertheless, their 
combined market share had declined by 28 percent points from 1992 levels, due to the 
rapid growth o f  riverboat gaming. Firm size by scale o f casino operations provides a full
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spectrum  o f  dimensions, ranging from mega-resorts in Atlantic City and the Las Vegas 
Strip to mini-casinos in m uch o f  Nevada and in riverboat jurisdictions (M arfels, 1999). 
Las Vegas Strip Gaming
There were over 400 unrestricted gaming licenses in Nevada in 1998, o f  which 
about 230 generated annual revenues o f  S 1 million or more. However, econom ies o f  scale 
in Nevada’s casino industry have led to a high concentration o f  revenues, and an even 
higher concentration o f profits, in the hands o f the largest gaming companies and 
operations (Eadington, 1999).
According to the Nevada State Gaming Control Board, casinos on the Las Vegas 
Strip have generated approximately half o f  all Nevada gaming revenue. Table 4  shows 
ratios o f  slot wins and table wins to total gaming revenue on the Las Vegas Strip since
1995. In 2000, slot wins accounted for 49.9 percent o f total gaming revenue on the Las 
Vegas Strip, while table win accounted for 50.1 percent o f  total gaming revenue. The 
table also shows that slot and table wins on the Las Vegas Strip increased significantly in 
1999, and again in 2000 due to openings o f several hotel-casinos in those years.
Table 4
Slot Wins 
(S in millions)
Slot Wins to 
Total win (%)
Table Wins 
(S in millions)
Table Wins to 
Total win (%)
1995 S 1,729 48.1 S 1,863 51.9
1996 1.760 49.7 1,783 50.3
1997 1,822 48.2 1.957 51.8
1998 1,939 51.3 1.843 48.7
1999 2,205 49.5 2,249 503
2000 2,380 49.9 2390 50.1
Note. From “Gaming Revenue Report,” by the Nevada G am ing Control Board 
(1995 -  2000).
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Meanwhile, the continued growth o f  gam ing on the Las Vegas Strip over the last 
thirty years has created skeptics. Bems ( 1998) suggests that the gam ing market is 
becoming overbuilt and saturated. Still, casino developers continue to build, believing 
growth will continue to draw  larger and more diverse group o f people. Oversupply has 
already created problems, however, for many casino operations.
Several gaming analysts, and even som e operators, predicted “doom and gloom” 
for the Las Vegas Strip in the early 1999, only to find that what they had called 
“overbuilding” actually helped build the Strip’s visitor base. The double-digit increases in 
gaming revenue that the Strip experienced in 2000 are not expected to be matched in 
2001, though even if  operators are still optimistic growth will occur (Holtmann, 2001).
If Las Vegas has indeed entered a new period characterized by more moderate 
growth, this has major implications for how casinos will compete for customers. 
Competitive conditions could be especially severe for older, more traditional casino 
brand names. As average hotel occupancies declined during 1997, tourists continued to 
patronize major Las Vegas Strip resorts, such as the Mirage, the M GM  Grand, etc., while 
smaller and older hotels were hardest hit (Steinhauer, 1997)
According to the Las Veeas Sun (Strow, 2001 ), Nevada casino operators are now 
telling two stories about their financial situations. One says that business is booming and 
expansion needed. The o ther says business is stagnant and com petition tough. Some 
casino operators say investor demand fuels continued bottom-line growth, and the 
gaming industry itself has presented indicators that show the N evada casino business has 
been booming over the past several years. For example. Cash Flow (EBITDA), a 
commonly used measure o f  gaming property profitability, rose 22 percent from 1999 to
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$2.2 billion for 20 o f the Strip’s largest properties in 2000. Nevada casinos took in $9.6 
billion in gaming revenues in 2000, up 6.4 percent from 1999. The picture for the Las 
Vegas Strip is similar: $4.8 billion in gaming revenues, up 26 percent from 1998. 
Operators say that the decline in casino profitability is primarily due to changes in the 
accounting system in 2000.
Atlantic Citv Gaming
Atlantic City’s first casino opened in 1978. It is a very com petitive market o f  12 
large casinos, supported primarily by day-trippers with a high frequency o f repeat visits. 
The primary feeder markets are the New York metropolitan area and Philadelphia. The 
intensely competitive market often results in periodic marketing wars that consist o f  
bus/coin giveaway packages, which generally result in lower EBITDA margins. (M iller 
&  Association, Inc., 2CXX)). In 1996, Atlantic C ity casinos were engaged in a  fierce 
m arketing war to compete for players. For the first half o f 1996, A tlantic City saw an 
increase in marketing and promotion expenses o f  $ 9 1.3 million, w hereas gaming revenue 
increased only $466.6 million (Gu, 1998).
In 1998, hotel guests accounted for an estim ated 21.6% o f  overall visits to 
A tlantic City, up from approximately 19.7% in 1997. Atlantic City recorded 34.3 million 
visits in 1998, almost four million more than did  Las Vegas. Approximately 30% o f  the 
c ity ’s visitors come from Pennsylvania (M iller &  Association, Inc., 2000).
The immediate surrounding population base and the growth o f  Atlantic C ity’s 
casino industry supply o f table and slot units have allowed Atlantic C ity  to flourish. 
Atlantic City casino revenues climbed from a m ere $325 million in 1979 to SI billion in 
1981 to over $3.9 billion in 1997. At the end o f  1997, Atlantic C ity’s gross gaming
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revenue o f  $3.9 billion was divided into approximately 70% slot revenues and 30% table 
revenues (Lowenhar, Repsher, & Taylor, 1999). Table 5 shows that the ratio o f  slot 
revenue to total gaming revenue has increased each year since 1995, while the ratio o f 
table revenue to total gaming revenue o f Atlantic City casinos has declined each year 
since then.
Table 5
Ratios o f  Slot W ins and Table W ins to Gaming Revenue in Atlantic Citv
Slot Wins 
($ in millions)
Slot Wins to 
Total win (%)
Table Wins 
($ in millions)
Table Wins to 
Total win (%)
1995 52,573 68.7 $1.175 31.3
1996 2,626 68.9 1.187 31.1
1997 2,702 69.6 1.186 30.4
1998 2,825 70.1 1.208 29.9
1999 2.996 71.0 1.208 29.0
2000 3,088 71.8 1.213 28.2
Note. From  “Annual Report,” by the New Jersey State Casino Control Com m ission 
( 1995 -  2(XX)).
G row th in slot revenues is a  function of an increase in the number o f  units, and in 
new slot product offerings, such as better pay-outs, video poker devices, etc. Slot revenue 
growth caters to the aging marketplace o f Atlantic C ity’s day-trippers. W ith an average 
age o f  55 and over during the m idweek, and with alm ost three-quarters o f  females 
playing slo t machines as their favorite game, it is not surprising that this shift in behavior 
has occurred (Lowenhar, Repsher, &  Taylor, 1999).
A ccording to the Press Plus (Saharko, 2001 ), the future success o f  Atlantic City 
depends on increasing the num ber o f  non-gaming entertainm ent options: on adding to the
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percentage o f travelers who come by air (to increase the average length o f stay); and on 
attracting visitors who spend more money, while the num ber o f visitors has not changed.
Income Statement Analysis 
Financial statement analysis is a judgmental process. One o f its primary 
objectives is identification o f major changes (turning points) in trends, amounts, and 
relationships, and investigation o f  the reasons underlying those changes (Gibson, 1999). 
Analysis o f income statements enhances a  user’s knowledge o f a hospitality property’s 
operations. This can be accomplished by horizontal analysis, vertical analysis, base-year 
comparisons, and ratio analysis (Schmidgall, 1997).
A comparison o f financial statements over several years can be undertaken by 
com puting the year-to-year change in absolute amounts and in terms o f  percentage 
changes. Horizontal analysis compares income statements for several accounting periods 
in terms o f both absolute and relative variances for each line item. The researcher should 
investigate any significant differences. Another common comparative analysis approach 
is to compare the most recent period’s operating results with the budget by determining 
absolute and relative variances (Schmidgall, 1997).
Horizontal analysis focuses on changes in accounting information from period to 
period. This type o f analysis can determine whether a  com pany’s sales, gross profit, 
expenses, and net income are increasing or decreasing over time, as well as what the 
change was in each o f these items from the previous year (Plewa & Friedlob, 1995).
Trend analysis is a  form o f  horizontal analysis that uses comparative financial 
statements for more than two successive periods. Trends are important, because although
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
comparing ju s t one year with another highlights unusual differences, these differences 
might not indicate a pattern (Plewa & Friedlob, 1995). Trend analysis informs the 
financial history o f  a firm for comparison. By looking at the trend o f  a  particular ratio, 
one sees w hether that ratio is falling, rising, or remaining relatively constant. This helps 
to either detect problems or observe good management (Gibson, 1999). When a 
comparison o f  financial statements covering more than three years is undertaken, the 
year-to-year method o f  comparison may become too cumbersome. The best way to do 
such long-term trend comparisons is by means o f  index numbers. Computation o f a series 
o f index num bers requires the choice o f  a base year that will, for all items, have an index 
amount o f  100.0. Since such a base year represents a frame o f  reference for all 
comparisons, it is best to choose a year that, in a business conditions sense, is as typical 
or normal as possible (Bernstein, 1978).
Vertical analysis focuses on financial relationships in a single period’s financial 
statements, rather than on dollar and percentage changes in financial statement items over 
time, as with horizontal analysis. A type o f vertical analysis presents financial statements 
that contain only percentages. Each com ponent o f  a  financial statem ent is shown as a 
percentage. The method presents every item in the statement as a  percentage o f the 
largest item in the statement. (Plewa &  Friedlob, 1995)
In the analysis o f  financial statements, it is often instructive to determine the 
proportion a  single item represents o f  a  total group or subgroup. The product o f vertical 
analysis is also referred to as common-size statements. Common-size financial statements 
differ from statem ents prepared under vertical analysis in that they present only 
percentages, not dollar amounts. These statements result from reducing all amounts to
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percentages, using total sales as a  common denominator. Vertical analysis allow s for 
more reasonable comparisons o f  tw o or more periods when activity for the two periods 
was at different levels (Schmidgall, 1997).
Ratio Analysis
Ratios are generally classified according to the type o f  information they provide. 
Five com m on ratios groupings are follows: liquidity; solvency; activity; profitability; and 
operating ratios. Liquidity ratios reveal the ability o f  a hospitality establishment to meet 
short-term obligations. Solvency ratios, on the other hand, measure the extent to which an 
enterprise has been financed by debt and is able to meet its long-term obligations.
Activity ratios reflect management’s ability to use the property’s assets to generate 
revenue, while several profitability ratios show m anagem ent’s overall effectiveness as 
measured by returns on sales and investments. Finally, operating ratios assist in the 
analysis o f  hospitality establishment operations (Schmidgall, 1997).
It should be recognized that many ratios have important variables in com m on with 
other ratios, thus tending to make them vary and be influenced by the same factors. 
Consequently, there is no need to  use all available ratios in order to diagnose a  given 
condition. Ratios, like most other relationships in financial analysis, are not significant in 
themselves, and can thus be interpreted only by com parison with ( 1 ) past ratios o f  the 
same enterprise, (2) some predetermined standard, o r (3) ratios o f  other com panies in the 
industry (Bernstein, 1978).
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In a  study related to this ratio analysis, Gu (1999) used ratio analysis for 
comparison in the analysis o f  financial conditions and performance o f  small and large 
casinos on the Las Vegas Strip using the 1997 Nevada Gaming Abstract. Ratio analysis 
revealed large casinos had better liquidity and relied less on debt financing. Large casinos 
also had higher returns on invested capital, and better returns on average asset ratios than 
did small casinos. Small casinos were less efficient in generating revenues, incurring 
higher cost o f  sales, labor costs, and higher debt leverage.
Upneja, Kim & Singh (2000) exam ined differences in financial characteristics 
between small and large firms in the casino industry. Firms were classified into small and 
large groups based on the median value o f  total asset size for 50 sam ple firms. Results 
showed that smaller firms have higher liquidity and higher short-term debt ratios. Larger 
firms had a higher proportion o f long term and total debt and did not enjoy economies o f 
scale, as they had lower efficiency ratios.
Economies o f  Scale
In the 1960s and 1970s, concepts o f  competitive advantage often were predicted 
upon steep scale economics, and many tool o f  strategic analysis were built upon those 
economics. It had shown as a form o f  growth-share matrices, experience curves and 
industry-supply curve (Christensen, 2001). Steep economies o f scale exist when there are 
high fixed vs. variable costs in the predom inant business model. Large organizations can 
amortize the fixed costs over greater volumes, condemning small competitors to playing 
the game on an adversely sloped playing field (Christensen, 2001).
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Economies o f  scale are present whenever large-scale production, distribution, o r  
retail processes have a  cost advantage over sm aller processes. According to C handler 
( 1990), it was the ability o f giant firms, such as Dupont and General Motors, to  exploit 
economies o f  scale that allowed them to succeed when their sm aller rivals failed.
However, economies o f scale are not always available. Many activities, such as farm ing, 
tailoring, and management consulting, do not appear to enjoy substantial scale econom ies. 
These activities are typically performed by individuals or relatively small firms (Besanko, 
Dranove & Shanley, 2000).
Economies o f  scale exist if the firm achieves unit-cost savings as it increases 
production o f  a given good or service. In other words, firms achieve economies o f  scale 
when their operating costs increase at a lower rate than their output (Katrishen & Scordis, 
1998). Economies o f scale are usually defined in terms o f declining average cost 
functions (Besanko. Dranove & Shanley, 2000). In manufacturing operations, plant 
volumes m ust reach a  certain minimum level for a  firm to achieve economies o f  scale. In 
industries, such as aircraft, automobile, chemical production, and petroleum m ining, plan 
volumes needed to achieve economies o f scale are so high that only a few firms can attain 
them without foreign sales (Chandler, 1990).
Economies o f  scale are also defined as arising in a multiregion economy when it 
is possible to increase the total amount produced in at least one region area for at least 
one market so that average production costs are reduced, even when increased econom ies 
o f  scale are not available (Ryan, 2000). Cam pbell and Verbeke ( 1994) proposed that 
service firms could achieve global economies o f  scale in marketing, o r image building.
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According to Cullen ( 1997), economies o f  scale can occur at different stages o f  a 
production process in the hospitality industry. Cullen (1997) also suggests that the 
traditional five sources o f  economies o f scale are: purchasing and production; 
management and personnel; marketing; finance: and risk.
1 ) Purchasing and production: Large scale production can lead to lower average 
costs because any individualities usually occur at low er levels o f  production, and there 
may be increasing returns to scale in production. Large purchases reduce processing costs 
per unit for suppliers, and enable them to reduce prices. Standardization o f  production 
processes across establishm ents increases standardization o f production equipm ent and 
materials required.
2) M anagement and personnel: Large organizations with standardized operating 
procedures can produce more cheaply, since training costs are reduced and managers 
more easily transferred between different units in an organization. This reduces 
disruption costs when managers either leave or do not meet requirements.
3) M arketing: Large firms can advertise and promote products more cheaply per 
unit produced since expenditures increase more slowly than the num ber o f  separate units. 
These can be establishm ent economies, particularly in respect to local promotion or 
enterprise economies.
4) Finance: Som e finance economies are closely linked with the size o f the 
establishment, but m ost are enterprise economies. Raising large sum s o f  money is usually 
cheaper due to relatively lower processing costs.
5) Risk: Any venture o r undertaking has risks attached to it. Risk means the 
variability o f  possible outcomes, that is to say, different events may result from a given
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action. The m ote variable the outcom e the greater the risk. Risk is a  bigger problem  for 
sm aller firms than for larger ones, since they are less likely to get and keep the required 
share o f  the market to keep costs down, o r to have accumulated sufficient financial 
reserves to tide them over in bad years, particularly the early years o f  operation.
G u (1999) analyzed financial conditions and performances o f  small and large 
casinos on the Las Vegas Strip by studying vertical income statements and ratios, which 
were presented in the 1997 Nevada Gam ing Abstract. Casinos with annual gam ing 
revenues o f  $72 million or more (21 casinos) were categorized in the Abstract as large 
casinos, while those with revenues below $72 million (15 casinos) were categorized as 
small casinos. He concluded that under-performance by small casinos was due largely to 
their overhead expenses, including rent and interest expenses. Small casinos’ higher 
overhead expenses, rent, and interest expenses must result from economies o f scale.
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CHAPTERS
METHODOLCXJY
Introduction
Chapter 3 will present methodology used in this study. This chapter consists o f  
three parts; ( I ) research objectives, (2) data collection and sam ples, and (3) research 
methods.
Research Objectives 
The primary research objective o f this study is to assess the state o f  the casino 
industry in two m ajor markets: the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City. Casino 
performances in the two markets are compared. Furthermore, this study investigates 
financial performances o f large casinos versus small casinos in the two markets. The first 
objective o f the study is to identify trends in revenue, cost, and profit margins o f  Las 
Vegas Strip casinos overall. The second objective o f  the study is to  exam ine trends in 
revenue, cost, and profit margins o f Atlantic City casinos overall. The third objective o f 
the study is to compare trends in casino operations (financial perform ance in particular) 
o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos. The fourth objective is to com pare the 
operations o f  small and large casinos in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip. Finally,
30
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the fifth objective is to examine trends and stability o f win revenues o f  slots and table 
gam es within these two markets.
These objectives will be achieved by collecting financial data  on Atlantic C ity and 
Las Vegas Strip casinos, interpreting the collected data, and com paratively analyzing 
derived findings using the research method that will be described later in this chapter.
The results and findings o f  the study will be presented in Chapter 4.
Data Collection and Samples 
As the data  being examined in this study was secondary in nature, the collection 
o f  financial inform ation o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos was done prim arily in the University 
o f  Nevada, Las Vegas library. The government collections section o f  the library owns 
copies o f the N evada Gaming Abstracts and G am ing Revenue Reports. Financial data o f 
Las Vegas Strip casinos used in this study was taken from the Nevada Gaming Abstract 
( 1995 — 2000) and the Gaming Revenue Report (1991 - 2000), which were published by 
the Nevada State Gaming Control Board.
In analyzing Las Vegas Strip casinos, this study focuses on two main aspects; first 
an investigation o f  aggregate income statem ents o f  overall Las Vegas Strip casinos; 
second is a  com parison o f  the aggregate financial performances o f  large and small Las 
Vegas Strip casinos. Nevada Gaming Abstract ( 1995 -  2000) was used for analysis o f  
aggregate incom e statements and ratios o f  I,as Vegas Strip casinos. The Abstract reports 
operation results o f  aggregate income statem ents, balance sheets, and ratios o f Las Vegas 
Strip casinos. T he Abstract also separates casinos on the Las Vegas Strip into two groups: 
15 small operations with annual gaming revenues o f  SI million to $72 million.
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categorized as “small casinos” in this study, and 22 large operations with annual gaming 
revenues o f $72 million and over, categorized as “large casinos” in this study.
To analyze revenue per unit o f  slot and table games within Las Vegas Strip 
casinos, this study used G am ing Revenue Report ( 1995 — 2000). The Report provides the 
aggregate monthly numbers o f  slot and table games, and total monthly gam ing revenues 
o f slot and table games for the Las Vegas Strip casinos with annual gam ing revenue o f $ 1 
million and over. It also separates casinos on the Las Vegas Strip into two groups, as does 
the Nevada Gaming Abstract. For the data used for capacity analysis o f  the Las Vegas 
Strip, this study used M arketing Bulletin (1995 — 2000), published by Las Vegas 
Convention & Visitors Authority, to ascertain numbers o f visitors and the average 
num ber o f  stayed nights. The num ber o f available rooms is taken from Nevada Gaming 
Abstract ( 1995 -  2000).
The data used in this study for Atlantic City casinos were based on the Annual 
Report ( 1995 -  2000) and on the Atlantic City Gaming Industry Economic Impact Report
(2000), both published by the New Jersey Casino Control Commission. The researcher 
was provided the data by mail from Mr. Daniel Heneghan, Director o f  Communications 
at the New Jersey Casino Control Commission.
In analyzing Atlantic City casinos, this study also examines two aspects, based on 
the Annual Report ( 1995 — 2000): first, it investigates Atlantic City casinos overall, and, 
second, it compares financial performances o f small casinos with those o f  large casinos 
by analyzing the aggregate income statements o f casinos within each category. The 
Report provides individual incom e statements from all twelve casinos in Atlantic City. 
For comparison large and small casinos in Atlantic City, this study categorized 7 casinos
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with annual gaming revenues o f  under $400 million as “sm all” and 5 casinos with annual 
gam ing revenues o f  $400 million and over as “large” , based on the 2000 Annual Report.
Since balance sheets o f  Atlantic City casinos were unavailable within the Annual 
Reports, this study does not deal with ratios involving balance sheet information in its 
com parison o f  large and small casinos in Atlantic C ity. Also, in its comparison of 
revenues per unit o f  slot and table games o f small casinos with those o f large casinos, the 
num ber o f units o f slot and table games and revenues o f  slot and table games are not 
separated into two categories, since data was aggregated from  all 12 Atlantic City casinos. 
This study analyzes only vertical income statements in comparing large and small 
Atlantic City casinos.
Table 3 presents the 37 samples used in this study for Las Vegas Strip casinos, 
with each property’s casino square feet and EBITDA. Table 4  presents the 12 samples o f  
Atlantic City casinos with each property’s casino square feet and total revenue.
Table 6
Lists o f  Las Vegas Strip Casinos in Sample
Properties Casino S.F. EBITDA
I Bally’s — Las Vegas/Paris Las Vegas 68.278 $ 130.0 Mr
2 Barbary Coast Hotel and Casino 31,000 NA
3 Bellagio 156,257 260.2 M
4 Boardwalk Casino — Holiday Inn 23,000 NA
5 Bourbon Street Hotel & Casino NA NA
6 Caesars Palace 125,000 105.0 M
7 Casino Royale and Hotel 15,000 NA
8 Circus Circus Hotel Casino 110,979 61.0 M
9 Desert Inn Resort 29300 12.0 M
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Table 6 (continued)
10 Excalibur Hotel and Casino 121344 82.1 M
II Flamingo Hilton Las Vegas 81.309 S 112.0 M
12 Gold Coast Hotel and Casino 71,000 NA
13 Hard Rock Hotel and Casino 28,000 NA
14 Harrah's Las Vegas Casino Hotel 86.664 74.6 M
15 Hotel San Remo Casino & Resort 27.000 NA
16 Imperial Palace hotel & Casino 47.625 38.9 M
17 Key Largo Casino & Hotel 8372 NA
18 Las Vegas Hilton 84,335 59.0 M
19 Luxor Hotel and Casino 100.000 106.4 M
20 Mandalay Bay 137340 93.5 M
21 MGM Grand Hotel/Casino 175,000 193.8 M
22 Michael Gaughan Airport Slots 11,835 NA
23 Mirage 94,000 136.0 M
24 Monte Carlo Resort & Casino 102,197 88.0 M
25 New Frontier Hotel and Casino 41325 6.4 M
26 New York-New York Hotel & Casino 87,254 86.3 M
27 Palace Station Hotel and Casino 84,000 NA
28 Rio Suite Casino Resort 99,500 98.7 M
29 Riviera Hotel and Casino 109,800 25.7 M
30 Royal Hotel Casino 6,100 NA
31 Sahara Hotel Casino 25,600 14.7 M
32 Slots-A-Fun 16,733 NA
33 Stardust Resort and Casino 65,538 14.4 M
34 Treasure Island at the Mirage 69,629 91.0 M
35 Tropicana Resort and Casino 62,327 15.1 M
36 Venetian Resort Hotel 105,344 50.4 M
37 Westward-Ho Casino 34,457 NA
Note. From “2000 Statistics and Key Ratios, Nevada Gam ing Almanac,’ 
2000 Bear, Steams & Co, Inc.
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Table 7
Lists o f  Atlantic Citv Casinos in Sample
Property Casino S.F. Total Revenue
1 AC Hilton 59.832 S393 M
2 Bally's Park Place 128.220 641 M
3 Ceasars 110,540 593 M
4 Claridge 59.071 197 M
5 Harrah's Marina 94.622 481 M
6 Resorts 61.930 283 M
7 Sands 55.278 272 M
8 Showboat 86.180 407 M
9 Tropicana 118.917 531 M
10 Trump Marina 79.997 329 M
11 Trump Plaza 85.253 395 M
12 Trump Taj Mahal 113.481 651 M
Notes. From “Annual Report,” by the State o f New Jersey Casino Control Com m ission 
(2000). “Atlantic City Gaming Industry Economic Impact Report,” by the State o f  New 
Jersey Casino Control Commission (2000).
Research M ethod
The research method o f this study is to use descriptive statistics in most areas. 
According to Frank & Altheon (1994), a descriptive statistic is a  numerical index that 
describes o r summarizes some characteristics o f  a  frequency or relative frequency 
distribution. Descriptive statistics are used to describe o r summarize data: usually they 
describe a group o f people or things in terms o f  numbers, tables, and charts (Clark, Riley, 
W ilkie & W ood, 1998). In the portion o f  this study examining trends and stability o f  
gaming wins o f  slots versus table gam es in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip, the 
study predicts gaming revenues by using the simple linear regression model.
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Las Vegas Strip Casinos 
In its analysis o f  overall Las Vegas Strip casinos, this study investigates trends in 
revenue, cost, and profil margin in term s o f  vertical and horizontal analysis, based on the 
aggregate income statements o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos. Unit analysis is also used in this 
study to evaluate efficiency o f casino operations on the Las Vegas Strip.
In vertical analysis o f Las V egas Strip casinos, every item o f  the aggregate 
income statements will be represented as a  percentage o f  total revenue. The aggregate 
income statements will be presented from 1995 to 2000 to analyze trends in revenue, cost, 
and profit margin as a percentage o f  total revenue on the Las Vegas Strip.
For horizontal analysis o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos, this study uses Las Vegas 
Strip casinos’ aggregate income statem ents, expressed as a  form o f horizontal analysis, 
which compares each amount with a  base amount for a  selected base year, 1995. From 
this analysis, relative changes o f  incom e statement items over time can be traced, and 
their significance assessed (Bernstein, 1978). The objective o f  doing horizontal analysis 
o f  aggregate income statements is to determ ine whether there are any distinguishing 
trends or growth relating to operations o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos.
For unit analysis o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos, daily win per table game, table 
win/unit/day, is calculated by dividing the total table win am ount by the num ber o f  table 
games, then dividing this sum by 365. Daily win per slot, slot w in/ unit/day, is also 
calculated by dividing the total slot w in amount by the num ber o f  slot machines, then 
dividing this num ber by 365. Revenue per unit o f  slot and table game from 1999 to  2000 
will be presented in this study.
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Atlantic C itv  Casinos 
In its overall analysis o f  Atlantic C ity  casinos, this study investigates trends in 
revenue, cost, and profit margin in terms o f  both vertical and horizontal analysis, based 
on aggregate income statements of Atlantic C ity  casinos. Unit analysis will also be used 
to evaluate efficiency o f  casino operations in Atlantic City.
In vertical analysis o f  Atlantic C ity casinos, each item o f  the aggregate income 
statements will be expressed as a percentage o f  total revenue. Aggregate income 
statements o f Atlantic C ity casinos from 1995 to 2000 will be presented in order to 
analyze trends in revenue, cost, and profit m argin as a percentage o f  total revenue. For 
horizontal analysis o f  Atlantic City casinos, this study uses aggregate income statements 
o f  Atlantic City casinos expressed as a  form o f  horizontal analysis, which compares each 
am ount with a base am ount for a selected base year, 1995. The objective o f this 
horizontal analysis o f  aggregate income statem ents is to determ ine any distinguishing 
trends or growth relating to operations o f  A tlantic City casinos.
For unit analysis o f  Atlantic C ity casinos, daily win per table, table win/unit/day, 
is calculated by dividing the total table win by the number o f  table games, then dividing 
this number by 365. Daily win per slot, slot win/unit/day, is also calculated by dividing 
the total slot win by the number o f slot m achines, then dividing this number by 365. The 
revenue per unit o f  slot and table games from 1995 to 2000 will be presented in this study.
Com parison Between the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic Citv 
In its com parative analysis o f  casino operations in Atlantic City and on the Las 
Vegas Strip, this study compares 2000 aggregate income statem ents o f  the two markets in 
term s o f vertical analysis. Trends in total costs and expenses, EBITDA, and profit margin
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o f  the two markets from 1995 to 2000 will be compared to identify differences in 
financial performance in Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos.
Unit analysis will be used to compare efficiency o f  operating table and slot games 
in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip. Daily win per table, table w in/unit/day, o f  
the two markets will be com pared from 1995 to 2000, and daily win per slot, slot 
win/unit/day, o f  the two markets will be also compared to evaluate efficiency o f  
operating slot machines from 1995 to 2000.
Capacity analysis will be used to compare capacities o f room, slot, and table 
games o f Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos, based on numbers o f visitors and 
average numbers o f stayed nights. Table 8 shows the num ber o f visitors, available rooms, 
slot, and table games o f  Atlantic City casinos from 1995 to 2000, while Table 9 shows 
the number o f  visitors, available rooms, slot, and table o f Las Vegas Strip casinos, which 
will provide the basic information for the capacity analysis.
Table 8
Data Used for Capacitv Analvsis o f  Atlantic Citv Casinos
Visitors' #/stayed #/Available Rooms" #/Slot #/Table
1995 33.27 N/A 3.345.932 28.324 1.368
1996 34.04 N/A 3.698.230 31.183 1.410
1997 34.07 N/A 3.932,925 33.606 1,488
1998 34.30 N/A 4,289,869 35.404 1.460
1999 33.65 N/A 4,258.216 37.044 1.398
2000 33.18 N/A 4.132,042 362237 1,298
Note. 1 Num ber o f visitors represented in millions. 2 Available rooms represents total 
number o f  available rooms per year in Atlantic City.
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Table 9
Data Used for Capacity Analysis o f  Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Visitors* #/stayed #/Available Rooms" #/Slot #/Table
1995 29.02 3.5 19,737,570 50,772 2,024
1996 29.64 3.7 19,897,860 52,231 2,126
1997 30.46 3.5 21,394,189 53,460 2.196
1998 30.61 3.3 22,529,899 55,246 2,301
1999 33.81 3.7 23,760,997 59,999 2,545
2000 35.85 3.7 26,405,279 6L307 2,668
Note. 1 N um ber o f  visitors represented in millions. 2 Available rooms represents total 
number o f  available rooms per year on the Las Vegas Strip.
Capacities o f  rooms, slot, and table games in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas 
Strip are calculated based on the numbers in Table 8 and Table 9 as follows:
1 ) Room Capacity = (Total number o f  available rooms per year)/
(Number o f visitors x Average number o f  stayed nights)
2) Slot Capacity = (Total num ber o f  slots x 365)/
(Number o f visitors x Average number o f  stayed nights)
3) Table Capacity =  (Total num ber o f  tables x 365) /
(Number o f visitors x Average number o f  stayed nights)
W hile the visitors’ average num ber o f  stayed nights on the Las Vegas Strip was 
obtained from the Las Vegas Convention &  Visitors Authority, the average number o f  
stayed nights o f visitors to Atlantic City has not been available. In this study, the average 
num ber o f  stayed nights o f visitors to A tlantic C ity will be supposed as 1.0, since hotel 
guests accounted for an estimated 21.6 percent o f  overall visits to Atlantic City in 1998 
(M iller &  Association, Inc, 2000).
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Finally, to com pare employee efficiency in Atlantic City w ith that o f  the Las 
Vegas Strip, this study analyzes revenue per employee o f the A tlantic City and Las Vegas 
Strip casinos. Revenue per employee is calculated by dividing total revenue by total 
num ber o f employees. It w ill be presented from 1995 to 2000, com paring revenue per 
employee o f Atlantic C ity  casinos with that o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos.
Comparison between Large and Small Casinos 
on the Las Veeas Strip and in Atlantic Citv 
In its com parison o f  large and small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip, this study 
compares 2000 aggregate income statements, ratios, and revenues per unit o f  table and 
slot games o f small casinos with those o f  large casinos. This study will analyze 2000 
aggregate income statem ents in its comparison o f  large and small casinos in Atlantic City, 
since ratios involving balance sheet information o f  Atlantic C ity casinos are unavailable.
Exam ination o f  Trends and Stabilitv o f Gaming Revenues 
This study exam ines trends and stability o f  the win revenue o f  slots versus table 
games in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip by running sim ple linear regression 
based on monthly data for the two markets from January 1991 to D ecem ber 2000. The 
sim ple linear regression for slot and table win revenues in Atlantic C ity  will be performed 
separately to exam ine stability and growth trends in aggregate slot and table win revenues. 
For Las Vegas Strip casinos, blackjack; baccarat; quarter slots; and dollar slots (the four 
m ajor gaming revenue generators on the Las Vegas Strip in 2000) will be examined for 
stability and growth trends by using the same regression method.
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On the Las Vegas Strip, quarter and dollar slots are the two major gam ing revenue 
generators for slot machines, while blackjack and baccarat are the two m ajor gam ing 
revenue generators for table games since 1991. In 2000, quarter and dollar slots 
contributed approximately 70 percent o f slot revenues and 35 percent o f  total gaming 
revenues on the Las Vegas Strip. Blackjack and baccarat contributed approximately 54 
percent o f  table revenues and 27 percent o f  total gaming revenues on the Las Vegas Strip. 
Data used for the regression was recorded from the Gaming Revenue Report (January 
1991 - Decem ber 2000), published by the Nevada Gaming Control Board, for the Las 
Vegas Strip; and Monthly Casino Revenue Reports (January 1991 — Decem ber 2000), 
published by the New Jersey Casino Control Com m ission, was used for A tlantic City.
The observed sample win data demonstrated clear seasonal variation. For the two 
types o f slot and table games on the Las Vegas Strip, low wins were observed from 
Novem ber to February, while wins in October were typically high. In Atlantic City, slot 
and table gam e wins were relatively low from Novem ber to February, while wins during 
the third quarter were typically high. To control the seasonality, all o f  the win data were 
deseasonalized by using the centered moving average method suggested by Anderson, 
Sweeney &  Sweeney (1998).
W in data demonstrated strong upward linear trends when plotted against the 
months. Trends represent results o f  a series o f  long-term factors, such as changes in 
population, demographic characteristics o f a population, technology, and consum er 
preferences (Anderson, Sweeney & Sweeney, 1998). Many long-term factors also 
contribute to the upward trends in gaming revenues on the Las Vegas Strip.
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According to Gu (1997), long-term factors for the upward trends in gaming 
revenues include: the nation’s increasingly positive attitude toward casino gaming, an 
increase in disposable income, a  growing number o f  international visitors to Las Vegas, 
and expansion o f gaming facilities and attractions. There may also be long-term factors 
counteracting this upward trend, such as competition from emerging markets and an 
actual o r perceived increase in numbers o f  crimes com m itted in Las Vegas. A trend 
represents the net result o f  the interactions o f those forces. To take away the trend’s 
impact is to control for these factors collectively.
This study will exam ine the stability o f  the win revenues o f  m ajor slots versus 
m ajor table games and the growth trend o f  win revenues for slot and table games by 
exam ining each gam e’s R" and slope b. High R" means not only good fit for the sample 
regression, but also the high stability o f  the gam e’s win revenues. Slope b  indicates the 
revenue growth trend o f the game as months go by.
The dependent variables o f  the regression model for the Las Vegas Strip are the 
deseasonalized monthly revenues o f  blackjack, baccarat, quarter slots, and dollar slots, 
from January 1991 to December 2CXK), and the deseasonalized monthly win revenues o f 
slots and table games for Atlantic City, based on the same period. The independent 
variables are time represented by each month from January 1991 to December 2(XX); 
January 1991 will be assigned to 1 and consequently December 2000 will be 120. The 
simple linear regression will be run separately with the each gam e’s deseasonalized 
gaming revenues as the dependent variable and tim e as the independent variable. The 
regression results will be discussed at the end o f  Chapter 4, Results and fundings.
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RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Introduction
In chapter 3, the research methodology and the collection o f  data were discussed. 
Chapter 4  will present the results and findings o f  this study. In the first part o f  this 
chapter, the result o f  analyzing trends in revenue, cost, profit margin, and revenue per 
unit o f  slot and table games on the Las Vegas Strip overall will be presented. In the 
second part, the financial performance o f Atlantic City casinos overall will be presented 
by analyzing trends in revenue, cost, profit margin, and revenue per unit o f  slot and table 
games. In the third part, financial performances o f  small and large casinos will be 
compared for the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City, respectively. The fourth part o f  this 
chapter will be a comparative analysis o f casino operations, and financial performance in 
particular, in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip. Finally, the regression results for 
examining trends and stability o f  game wins in the two markets will be presented in the 
fifth part o f  this chapter.
Las Vegas Strip Casinos 
The I990’s showed tremendous casino grow th on the Las Vegas Strip, both in 
operation size and number o f  properties. A new era o f  “M ega” resorts was begun in late
43
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1989, w ith the opening o f  the Mirage, followed by the 1990 opening o f  the Excalibur.
This trend o f  “Mega” resorts continued in 1993 with the opening o f  Treasure Island, the 
Luxor, and the MGM Grand. These attractive them ed casinos opening in 1993 
contributed to a record 19.9% increase in visitor volume in 1994. In 1996, the Monte 
Carlo and the Stratosphere both opened, and the Sands and the Hacienda were also 
imploded to make way for new er casinos. In 1997, New York New York opened, and 
room expansions took place at The Rio, Harrah’s and Caesar’s. The old Aladdin was 
imploded in 1998, and The Bellagio opened in the fourth quarter o f  that year. In addition, 
M cCarran Airport expansion was completed, making Las Vegas’s airport capable o f 
handling 45 million visitors annually. In 1999, three more large “M ega” resorts,
M andalay Bay, Venetian, and Paris, were opened. Finally, the Aladdin opened in 2000. 
Currently, Las Vegas has a  115,000-room inventory, with the consecutive openings of 
these mega resorts.
To evaluate the financial performance o f the overall Las Vegas Strip casinos, this 
part o f  the chapter presents the results o f vertical incom e statem ent analysis, horizontal 
income statement analysis, and revenue per unit analysis.
Vertical Analvsis
According to Bear &  Steams, Inc. (2000), non-gam ing revenue sources o f the Las 
Vegas Strip have increased in importance to drive custom er visits and increased length o f 
stay. Gam ing as a  percentage o f  total revenue has declined each year since 1995. In 
particular, food and beverage consumption has become a  meaningful revenue contributor, 
as more and more Las Vegas Strip casino operators have turned to upscale restaurants to 
attract patrons to their properties.
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Table 10 represents aggregate income statem ents o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos from 
1995 to 2000 with annual gaming revenues o f $1 m illion and over. This revenue 
distribution suggests that the gaming department constitutes the largest revenue center o f  
the Las Vegas Strip. However, since 1995, gaming revenue as a  percentage o f total 
revenue has declined each year, from 53.8 percent in 1995 to 45.9 percent in 2000. On 
the o ther hand, non-gaming revenue centers have seen fast increases, especially in rooms 
and other revenue centers. The room departm ent’s revenue as a  percentage o f total 
revenue has significantly increased since 1995, from 19.6 percent in 1995 to 23.3 percent 
in 2000. O ther departm ent’s revenues’ which constitutes, for exam ple, leases o f  malls 
and restaurants, entertainment shows, clubs, and spas, have also significantly increased 
from 10.6 percent o f total revenue in 1995 to 13.5 percent o f  total revenue in 2000. The 
food departm ent’s revenue has increased from 11.2 percent o f  total revenue in 1995 to 
12.3 percent o f  total revenue in 2000. The beverage departm ent’s revenue as a percentage 
o f total revenue has slightly increased since 1996.
Com bined costs o f  sales at Las Vegas Strip casinos have accounted for 6.9 
percent o f  total revenue since 1997, leading to 93.1 percent o f  gross margin as a 
percentage o f  total revenue since then, due to their increased power o f  purchasing 
econom ies o f  scale. Complimentary expenses as a  percentage o f  total revenue have 
increased on the Las Vegas Strip since 1995, from 8.5 percent in 1995 to 9.1 percent in 
2000. In competitive destination hotel-casino markets such as the Las Vegas Strip, 
Atlantic City, and M ississippi casinos, use o f com plim entaries, o r “com ps” to attract 
custom ers to their properties. The presence o f increased com plim entary expenses on the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
Las Vegas Strip explains why the market became more competitive, primarily due to 
several hotel-casinos’ openings.
Payroll and related expenses o f  revenue centers have consistently accounted for 
26 to 27 percent o f total revenue since 1995. O ther operating departmental expenses have 
accounted for 16 to 17 percent o f  total revenue since 1995, with no significant changes. 
Departmental income, gross margin minus all departmental expenses, as a  percentage of 
total revenue has increased gradually since 1998.
Total general and adm inistrative expenses as a  percentage o f total revenue have 
significantly increased by 4.3 percent o f  total revenue in 2000 from 1995. Primary 
contributors to this increase were other general and administrative expenses: management 
fees, corporation fees, and internal maintenance fees, such as internal information 
systems. O ther general and adm inistrative expenses, as a  percentage o f total revenue, 
have significantly increased since 1995, from 6.0 percent in 1995 to 9.4 percent in 2000. 
Advertising and promotion expenses have accounted for 1.9 percent o f  total revenue for 
the most recent three years, which increased from 1.6 percent o f  total revenue in 1995 
due to a more competitive environment. Bad debt expenses have also accounted for 2.1 to 
2.6 percent o f  total revenue since 1995, but have declined to 2.3 percent o f  total revenue 
in 2000. M usic and entertainm ent expenses have significantly increased since 1995, from
1.0 percent o f  total revenue in 1995 to 1.7 percent o f  total revenue in 2000, for non­
gaming tourists. Payroll and related expenses o f  non-revenue centers increased to 7.0 
percent o f  total revenue in 2000, from 6.7 percent o f  total revenue in 1995. O ther 
expenses, such as energy; equipm ent rental or lease; and rent o f  premises, have seen no 
significant changes since 1995. However, energy expenses will significantly increase in
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2001, due to the rising energy prices, so other expenses should be lowered to make up for 
this increase.
Due to a  significant increase in total general and administrative expenses as a 
percentage o f  total revenue, EBITDA of the Las Vegas Strip has declined each year since 
1996, from 22.6 percent o f  total revenue in 1996 to 17.1 percent o f  total revenue in 2000. 
Moreover, depreciation and amortization as a  percentage o f  total revenue has increased 
by 2.0 percent, from 6.2 percent in 1996 to 8.2 percent in 2000, due to several hotel- 
casinos’ openings in 1999 and 2000. Interest expense as a percentage o f  total revenue 
have also significantly increased, especially from 2.0 percent in 1998 to 4.9 percent in 
1999, and to 7.1 percent in 2000, primarily due to changes in accounting methods in 2000.
The prim ary reason for the declining profit margin o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos was 
caused by their significantly increased total general and adm inistrative expenses, o ther 
general and adm inistrative items in particular. In 2000, depreciation and amortization o f 
Las Vegas Strip casinos increased by 2.0 percent o f  total revenue from 1996, due to 
several hotel-casinos’ openings during the period, while interest expenses have 
significantly risen by 5.5 percent o f total revenue since 1997, caused by increased debt 
financing and the change in casino accounting methods in 2000 (Strow, 2001). Those two 
expenses have accelerated Las Vegas Strip casinos’ tendencies to generate declining net 
income before taxes and extraordinary items, from 14.2 percent o f  total revenue in 1996 
to 1.8 percent o f  total revenue in 2000, while EBITDA as a percentage o f  total revenue 
has declined moderately.
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Table 10
Vertical Analysts o f  Aggregate Income Statements o f  Las Vegas Strip Casinos
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2(XX)
Revenue
Gaming 53.8 52.9 51.5 50.3 48.1 45.9
Rooms 19.6 20.3 21.7 21.9 22.1 23.3
Food 11.2 11.0 10.9 11.5 12.0 12.3
Beverage 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9
Other 10.6 11.2 11.2 11.6 13.0 133
T otal Revenue 100.0 100.0 lOO.O lOO.O lOO.O lOO.O
Cost o f Sales 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9
Gross Margin 92.6 92.9 93.1 93.1 93.1 93.1
Complimentary expenses 8.5 8.6 7.8 9.0 9.1 9.1
Payroll and related expenses (revenue centers) 27.0 26.3 26.8 26.6 26.7 26.3
Other departmental expenses 15.8 15.9 16.9 17.2 16.5 16.2
Departmental-Income 41.3 42.2 41.7 40.3 40.8 41.6
G eneral & Adm inistrative Expenses
Advertising & Promotion 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9
Bad Debt Expense 2.5 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.6 2 3
Energy Expense (electricity, gas, etc) 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 l . l 13
Equipment Rental or Lease 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.08
Music & Entertainment l.O 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.7
Payroll and related expenses (non-revenue centers) 6.7 6.7 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0
Rent o f Premises 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.9
Other General & Administrative Expenses 6.0 5.9 6.7 6.1 7.6 9.4
T otal G eneral & Adm inistrative Expenses 20.3 196 20.7 20.1 22.2 24.6
EBITDA 21.1 22.6 21.0 20.3 18.7 17.1
Depreciation and Amortization 6.2 6.2 6.6 7.4 7.6 8.2
Interest Expense 3.1 2 3 1.6 2.0 4.9 7.1
N et Income Before Income Taxes &
Extraordinary Items 11.7 143 12.8 10.9 6.3 1.8
Notes. From  “Nevada Gam ing Abstract,” by the N evada State Gam ing Control Board 
(1995 — 2(XX)). All items are expressed as a  percentage o f  the aggregate hotel-casinos’ 
total revenue.
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H gure I shows that total operating costs and expenses as a  percentage o f  total 
revenue on the Las Vegas Strip have increased each year since 1996, from 68.8 percent in 
1996 to 73.8 percent in 2000. Correspondingly, EBITDA and profit margins as a 
percentage o f  total revenue have declined each year since then.
Gaps between EBITDA and profit margins as a  percentage o f  total revenue have 
been getting w ider since 1997. This means that interest expenses, and depreciation and 
amortization as percentages o f total revenue have increased even faster than the increase 
in total costs and expenses as a percentage o f  total revenue, and significantly caused the 
sudden decline in net income before income taxes and extraordinary items o f Las Vegas 
Strip casinos, especially in 1999 and 2000.
80.0
Trend of Las V egas Strip casin o s
■Total Costs and Expenses ■EBITDA •Profit Margins* |
a  60.0
a  40.0
S 20.0
1995
Figure I. Total Costs and Expenses, EBITDA, and Profit Margins o f Las Vegas 
Strip Casinos *Net Income Before Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items.
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Horizontal Analysts 
Table 11 shows aggregate income statements o f Las Vegas Strip casinos from 
1995 to 2000 with annual gam ing revenues o f $1 million and over. The aggregate income 
statement is expressed as a  form o f  horizontal analysis, which com pares each amount 
with a base amount for a  selected base year o f  1995. Revenue distribution o f  Las Vegas 
Strip casinos suggests that each revenue center grew significantly in 1999 and 2000, 
when several hotel-casinos on the Las Vegas Strip opened.
O ther department, which constitutes leases o f  malls and restaurants; entertainm ent 
shows; clubs; and spas, has grown into promising revenue centers in term s o f  revenue, 
having increased by 199.0 percent in 2000 over the base year. Room departm ent revenues 
have also increased rapidly, by 185.5 percent over the base period. Food departm ent 
revenues have grown by 172.5 percent in 2000, while beverage revenue grew by 157.7 
percent in 2000 over the base period. Gaming revenue has grown by 133.2 percent in 
2000 over the base period, showing the least growth among the revenue centers. As a 
result, total revenue o f Las Vegas Strip casinos grew by 154.9 percent in 2000 over the 
base period, showing significant increases in both 1999 and 2000.
Combined cost o f  sales o f  the Las Vegas Strip has increased by only 144.2 
percent in 2000 over the base period, slower than growth o f total revenue, due to 
increased power o f purchasing economies o f scale. Complimentary expenses have 
increased by 167.3 percent in 2000, while other operating departmental expenses have 
increased by 159.7 percent over the base period. Both o f these increased rapidly in 1999 
and 2000, faster than did growth o f  total revenue. Payroll and related expenses o f  these 
various revenue centers increased by 151.7 percent in 2000 over the base period.
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offsetting fast increase o f  complimentary and other operating departmental expenses. 
Altogether, departm ental income, gross margin minus total departmental expenses, has 
increased in 2000 by 157.1 percent, faster than has growth o f  total revenue, 154.9 percent.
Total general and administrative expenses, however, have increased by 189.0 
percent in 2000 over the base period, much faster than has the growth o f  total revenue. In 
2000, the fastest growing item among total general and adm inistrative expenses was 
m usic and entertainm ent, which increased by 254.4 percent over the base period. W ith 
openings o f several hotel-casinos in 1999 and 2000, Las Vegas Strip casinos spent more 
on music and entertainm ent for non-gaming tourists than ever before. O ther general and 
administrative expenses including management fees, corporation fees, and internal 
maintenance fees have increased rapidly by 244.0 percent in 2000 since 1995, 
significantly contributing to overall increases in total general and administrative expenses.
In 2000, advertising and promotional expenses increased by 177.7 percent, while 
bad debt expenses increased by 143.4 percent over the base period. Payroll and related 
expenses o f  non-revenue centers increased by 161.9 percent in 2000 over the base period. 
These three items, along with energy expenses; equipm ent rental o r lease; and rent o f  
premises offset fast increases in music and entertainment and other general and 
adm inistrative expenses.
Due to a  faster increase in total general and administrative expenses than in total 
revenue, EBIT DA, departmental income minus total general and administrative expenses, 
increased by only 126.4 percent in 2000 over the base period. M oreover, depreciation and 
amortization have seen a  fast increase o f  203.8 percent in 2000, faster than the growth o f 
total revenue. Interest expense has declined for three years since 1995; however, it
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jum ped to 204.4 percent in 1999 and then to 352.4 percent in 2000, due to increased debt 
financing and changes in the casinos’ accounting methods in 2000. Significant increases 
in interest expenses, and depreciation and amortization (faster than the growth o f  total 
revenue) have significantly affected the sudden decline o f  profit margin in 1999 and 2000.
Net income before income taxes and extraordinary items increased, in 1996, to 
127.4 percent over the base period since Las Vegas Strip casinos controlled total 
operating costs and expenses in 1996. However, total operating costs and expenses o f  Las 
Vegas Strip casinos in 1999 and 2000 grew much faster than did total revenue, 
significantly contributing to the decline o f  EBITDA and net income before incom e taxes 
and extraordinary items. Primary contributors to the decline o f net income before income 
taxes and extraordinary items were a  much faster increase in total general and 
adm inistrative expenses, other general and administrative items in particular, than in total 
revenue in 1999 and 2000. Las Vegas Strip casino operators would have done well to pay 
more attention to control total general and administrative expenses during those years. 
M oreover, the fast increase o f interest expenses, and o f  depreciation and am ortization in 
1999 and 2000, contributed to a significant decline in net income before income taxes 
and extraordinary items on the Las Vegas Strip.
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Table 11
Horizontal Analvsis o f  Aggregate Income Statements o f  Las Vegas Strip Casinos
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2(XX)
Revenue
Gaining 1(X).0 1033 103.8 105.7 117.4 133.2
Rooms 1(X).0 108.4 119.7 1263 148.1 185.5
Food 1(X).0 103.3 106.2 116.3 140.9 172.5
Beverage 100.0 102.2 104.6 112.0 130.2 157.7
Other 100.0 111.1 114.9 124.0 161.3 199.0
Total Revenue 100.0 104.9 109.2 1123 1303 154.9
Cost o f Sales 100.0 100.7 100.2 104.6 122.2 144.2
Gross Margin 100.0 105.4 109.1 113.8 132.1 156.9
Complimentary expenses 100.0 106.1 99.4 120.2 140.5 167.3
Payroll and related expenses (revenue centers) 100.0 102.3 107.5 111.7 129.9 151.7
Other departmental expenses 100.0 105.5 116.1 123.4 137.1 159.7
Departmental-lncome 100.0 107.2 109.4 110.3 129.8 157.1
General & Adm inistrative Expenses
Advertising & Promotion 100.0 105.7 121.2 132.2 150.2 177.7
Bad Debt Expense 100.0 86.7 91.8 112.2 136.9 143.4
Energy Expense (electricity, gas, etc) 100.0 95.6 100.6 96.7 109.1 150.2
Equipment Rental or Lease 100.0 46.3 51.8 473 47.7 100.9
Music & Entertainment 100.0 106.1 105.4 78.2 160.1 254.4
Payroll and related expenses (non-revenue centers) 100.0 106.3 110.0 116.0 134.5 161.9
Rent o f E*remises 100.0 99.1 105.1 90.0 109.6 167.7
Other General & Administrative Expenses 100.0 103.8 121.4 115.5 166.6 244.0
Total G eneral & Adm inistrative Expenses 100.0 101.7 110.6 112.0 143.7 189.0
EBITDA 100.0 112.6 108.2 108.6 116.4 126.4
Depreciation and Amortization 100.0 103.3 115.0 132.8 158.3 203.8
Interest Expense 100.0 75.9 5 6 3 74.3 204.4 352.4
Net Income Before Income Taxes &
Extraordinary Items 100.0 127.4 118.6 105.0 70.4 2 4 3
Notes. From “Nevada Gaming Abstract,” by the Nevada State Gaming Control Board 
( 1995 — 2000). All items are expressed as a  percentage, based on every item o f 1995.
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Unit Analvsis
Unit analysts is used in this study to evaluate efficiency o f slot and table 
operations on the Las Vegas Strip. For the unit analysis, daily win per table and daily win 
per slot were calculated each year since 1995. Each o f these was calculated by dividing 
total table/slot revenue for the year by total number o f table/slots for the year, then 
dividing it by 365. Table win/unit/day explains the daily win per table o f Las Vegas Strip 
casinos, and slot win/unit/day explains the daily win per slot on the Las Vegas Strip.
Trend of Table Win/Unlt/Day
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Figure 2. Daily W in Per Table o f  Las Vegas Strip Casinos
As shown in Figure 2, daily win per table o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos has been up 
and down each year since 1995, showing an increase in the most recent three years.
Every table game on the Las Vegas Strip had an average daily win o f  $2,521 in 1995, but 
this decreased to an average daily win o f  $2,298 in 1996, and then increased to average 
daily win o f $2,441 in 1997. In 1998, the daily win per table was $2,194, the lowest on 
the Las Vegas Strip since 1995, due to an oversupply o f  table games for that year. Since
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then, daily w in per table averages have risen. Every table game won a daily average 
$2,455 in 2000, $66 lower than in 1995, while the num ber o f  table games on the Las 
Vegas Strip significantly increased from 2,024 in 1995 to 2,668 in 2000, due to openings 
o f several hotel-casinos in 1999 and 2000.
Trend of Slot Win/Unlt/Day
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Figure 3 . Daily W in Per Slot o f  Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Figure 3 shows that daily win per slot o f the Las Vegas Strip has consistently 
increased since 1996. On the Las Vegas Strip, every slot machine won an average o f $92 
in 1996. The daily win per slot on the Las Vegas Strip was $ 106 in 2000, while the 
num ber o f  slot machines significantly increased from 50,772 in 1995 to 61,307 in 2000, 
due to openings o f several hotel-casinos in 1999 and 2000. Slot win revenues on the Las 
Vegas Strip accounted for 50.8 percent o f total gaming revenue in 2000.
Summarv
Las Vegas Strip casinos have grown rapidly since 1995 in terms o f  both revenues 
and num bers o f  visitors. Non-gaming revenue sources have increased in importance to
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drive revenues higher, while gam ing revenue as a percentage o f  total revenue has 
declined by 7.9 percent in 2000 from 1995. This overall trend means that the Las Vegas 
Strip has been making efforts to reposition itself as a multi-entertainment destination, 
rather than rem aining a mere gam ing capital. The declining share o f  gaming revenue 
reflects revenue diversification resulting from the changing nature o f the Las Vegas Strip 
(Gu, 1999).
M eanwhile, net income before income taxes and extraordinary items o f  aggregate 
Las Vegas Strip casinos has declined dramatically since 1996, especially in 1999 and 
2(X)0. Primary contributors to the declining profit margin were rapid increases in other 
general and administrative expenses; management fees; corporate fees; and internal 
maintenance fees, interest expenses, and depreciation and amortization. The Las Vegas 
Strip should have paid more attention to controlling its costs and expenses. In addition, 
the change in the casino accounting methods in Nevada in 20(X) accelerated the decline o f 
the profit margin, significantly contributing to the high interest expenses o f the years 
(Strow, 2001 ).
Daily win per slot and daily win per table have both gradually increased since 
1998, although there have been significant increases in the num ber o f slots and table 
games on the Las Vegas Strip due to openings o f several hotel-casinos in 1999 and 2(X)0. 
Despite fast rising gaming revenues due to increased daily win per table and daily win 
per slot, total costs and expenses, including interest expenses and depreciation and 
amortization, have increased even faster since 1998, resulting in a decreased net income 
before income taxes and extraordinary items on the Las Vegas Strip.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
Atlantic City Casinos
To evaluate the overall financial performance o f  Atlantic City casinos, this part o f  
the chapter analyzes Atlantic City casinos’ vertical income statements, horizontal income 
statem ents, and revenue per unit o f table and slot games.
Vertical Analvsis
According to Bear & Steams, Inc. (2000), Atlantic C ity casinos’ gam ing as a  
percentage o f  total revenue has consistently been in the 8 1 —82 percent range, indicating 
that Atlantic City remains primarily a  day-trip market. Room  revenue as a percentage o f  
total revenue remains low at approximately 6.0 percent o f  total revenue. In particular, 
food and beverage is a meaningful revenue contributor, as Las Vegas Strip casino 
operators have turned to upscale restaurants to attract patrons to their properties.
Table 12 illustrates aggregate income statements o f  Atlantic City casinos from 
1995 to 2000, with every item shown as a  percentage o f  total revenue. Revenue 
distribution suggests that Atlantic C ity casinos depend heavily on gaming revenue centers, 
which have been responsible for approximately 8 1 - 8 2  percent o f  total revenue since 
1995. Accordingly, non-gaming revenues have shown less than 20 percent o f  total 
revenue since then. Non-gaming revenue distribution shows that there have been no 
significant changes: each department’s revenue as a percentage o f  total revenue has 
remained nearly constant since 1995. In 2000, gaming as a  percentage o f total revenue 
increased by 0.4 percent o f total revenue, while each o f the non-gaming revenues 
decreased slightly over 1999.
Promotional allowances as a  percentage o f total revenue in Atlantic C ity 
accounted for 10.4 percent o f total revenue in 1995. However, these have increased to
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11-2 percent o f  total revenue since 1996. In other words, A tlantic City casinos became 
more com petitive markets, so that they needed to spend 11.2 percent o f total revenue to 
attract people to their properties since 1996. Promotional allowances as a  percentage o f 
total revenue declined to 10.9 percent in 2000; this led to 0.3 percent increased net 
revenue for A tlantic City casinos, 8 9 .1 percent o f total revenue.
Total operating costs and expenses increased significantly to 71.5 percent o f  total 
revenue in 1996 from 67.7 percent o f  total revenue in 1995. This intensely com petitive 
market often resulted in periodic marketing wars that consisted o f bus/coin giveaway 
packages, which generally resulted in lower EBITDA. Throughout 1996 and into 1997, 
there was much discount marketing and effusive coin giveaways, which incurred high 
costs in Atlantic City (Rutherford, 1999). The extensive marketing war in A tlantic City in 
1996 led Atlantic City to incur significantly high expenses.
Total operating costs and expenses as a  percentage o f  total revenue have declined 
each year since 1996, giving proof o f  casino operators’ cost-control efforts. In 2000, 
combined costs o f  goods and services (which constitute mainly employee payroll) 
decreased by 0.9 percent o f  total revenue; and selling, general and adm inistrative 
expenses as a  percentage o f total revenue decreased by 2.7 percent since 1996. Bad debt 
expenses and provisions for doubtful accounts as a  percentage o f total revenue have 
gradually increased each year since 1995; however, they have amounted to less than 1.0 
percent o f  total revenue for Atlantic City casinos, and declined to 0.6 percent o f  total 
revenue in 2000. Due to decline in those three items, total operating costs and expenses 
have decreased by 3.5 percent o f  total revenue since 1996, from 71.5 percent in 1996 to
68.0 percent in 2000.
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As a result, gross operating profit (net revenue minus total operating costs and 
expenses) has increased each year, since 1996, from 17.3 percent o f  total revenue in 1996 
to 21.0 percent in 2(KX). However, other expenses (which constitute corporation fees and 
internal maintenance fees such as internal inform ation systems) have increased each year 
since 1995, from 2.0 percent o f  total revenue in 1995 to 3.3 percent o f total revenue in 
2000. In addition, there was a  huge increase in non-operating expenses for the Claridge 
and Trump Plaza, 3.3 percent o f  total revenue in 1999, seriously affecting the declines o f 
EBITDA and profit margin for the year. Due to increasing gross operating profits, 
EBITDA as a  percentage o f  total revenue has increased since 1996, except a  significant 
drop in 1999, caused by high non-operating expenses for that year.
Depreciation and amortization decreased to 5.1 percent o f  total revenue in 2(XX) 
from 6.0 percent o f  total revenue in 1998. Interest expenses as a percentage o f  total 
revenue declined from 1995 to 1998; however, this begun to increase against in 1998, 
from 8.1 percent o f  total revenue in 1998 to 9.3 percent o f  total revenue in 2000.
In 1996, net income before income taxes and extraordinary items as a  percentage 
o f total revenue o f  Atlantic City casinos dropped to 0 .4  percent o f  total revenue, from 4.5 
percent o f  total revenue in 1995, due to a  significant increase in total operating costs and 
expenses, an evidence o f the huge marketing war. However, the profit margin as a  
percentage o f  total revenue has gradually increased since 1996. In 1999, due to high costs 
o f  non-operating expenses, profit margin and EBIT DA  as a  percentage o f total revenue 
seriously declined during the year. In 2000, however, Atlantic City casinos showed 
moderate growth in terms o f EBITDA and profit margin percentage, continuing to 
decrease their total operating costs and expenses.
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Table 12
Vertical Analvsis o f  Aggregate Income Statements o f A tlantic Citv Casinos
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Revenues
Gaming 82.1 81.3 81.0 80.9 81.2 81.6
Rooms 5.6 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.0
Food and Beverage 9.9 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.0 9.9
Other 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.5
Total Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Less: Promotional Allowances 10.4 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 10.9
Net Revenue 89.6 88.8 88.8 88.8 88.8 89.1
Costs and Expenses:
Cost of Goods and Services 45.1 47.3 48.3 47.6 46.8 46.4
Selling. General, and Administrative 22.1 23.7 21.2 20.9 21.3 21.0
Provision for Doubtful Accounts 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6
Total Operating Costs and Expenses 67.7 713 70.1 6 9 3 69.1 68.0
Gross Operating Profit 21.9 173 18.6 193 19.7 21.0
Other Expenses 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.3
Investment and Non-operating Expenses 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 3.3 0.4
EBITDA 18.7 14.6 15.7 163 13.1 173
Depreciation and Amortization 5.3 5.5 5.5 6.0 5.7 5.1
Interest Expense 9.0 8.6 8.3 8.1 9.1 9.3
Net income (Loss) Before Income Taxes 4 3 0.4 1.9 2 3 (1.8) 2 3
& Extraordinary Items.
Note. From “Annual Report,” by New Jersey Casino Control Commission ( 1995 — 2000). 
All items are expressed as a percentage o f  the aggregate hotel-casinos’ total revenue.
As shown in Figure 4, in 1995, Atlantic City casinos had high EBITDA and profit 
margin as a  percentage o f  total revenue, with 67.7 percent o f  total revenue in total 
operating costs and expenses. In 1996, however, Atlantic City casinos had much higher 
total operating costs and expenses, 71.5 percent o f total revenue, so that they generated 
significantly lower EBITDA and profit margins than the previous year. Since 1996,
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Atlantic C ity casinos have gradually improved in term s o f  declining total operating costs 
and  expenses and increasing EBITDA and profit m argins as a  percentage o f  total revenue. 
Total costs and expenses o f  Atlantic City casinos have gradually declined each year since 
1996, from 71.5 percent o f  total revenue in 1996 to 68.0 percent o f  total revenue in 2000.
The decline in total operating costs and expenses led Atlantic City casino 
operators to have increasing EBITDA and profit margins as a percentage o f  total revenue, 
except for a  sudden decline in 1999, when the Claridge and Trump Plaza each had 
considerable non-operating expenses. These two casinos spent 3.3 percent o f  total 
revenue for their non-operating expenses for the year, which caused a serious decline o f  
EBITDA and profit margin for aggregate Atlantic C ity casinos. In 2000, EBIT DA as a 
percentage o f  total revenue increased by 2.6 percent, while profit margin as a percentage 
o f  total revenue in Atlantic C ity increased by 2.4 percent from 1996.
I Trend of Atlantic City casinos '
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Figure 4. Total Costs and Expenses, EBITDA, and Profit M argins o f  Atlantic C ity 
Casinos *Net Incom e (Loss) Before Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items.
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Horizontal Analvsis
Table 13 shows aggregate income statements o f Atlantic City casinos from 1995 
to 2000, expressed as a form o f horizontal analysis, which compares each amount with a 
base amount for a  selected base year o f 1995. Revenue distribution for Atlantic City 
casinos shows that room departments grew into the promising revenue centers, which 
increased revenue by 121.7 percent in 2000 over the 1995 base year. O ther departm ent’ 
revenues’ has increased by 117.3 percent in 2000 over the base period. Food and 
beverage departm ents’ revenues have increased by 113.8 percent, while gaming revenue 
for Atlantic City has increased by 112.9 percent in 2000 over the base period. Altogether, 
total revenue o f  Atlantic City casinos increased by 113.6 percent in 2000 over the base 
period.
In 1996, promotional allowances significantly increased to 110.6 percent over 
1995, due to the fierce marketing war to com pete for players (Rutherford, 1999). After 
showing moderate growth since then, promotional allowances have increased by 119.6 
percent in 2000 over the base period. The increase o f promotional allowances has been 
faster than that o f  total revenue; it has led to a 112.9 percent increase in net revenue in 
2000 over the base period.
Total operating costs and expenses o f  Atlantic City casinos have increased by 
114.2 percent in 2CX)0 over the base period, faster than the total revenue’s 113.6 percent. 
The fastest growing item was provision for doubtful accounts, which increased by 248.6 
percent in 1999, and by 160.8 percent in 2000 over the base period. The combined cost o f 
goods and services, which constitutes mainly employee payroll, has gradually increased 
since 1996, after an initial rapid increase o f  107.4 percent in 1996. Selling, general, and
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administrative expenses have increased by only 107.9 percent in 2000 over the base 
period, offsetting the high inci'ease o f provision for doubtful accounts and cost o f  goods 
and services.
Due to a dramatic increase in total operating costs and expenses in 1996, gross 
operating profit (net revenue minus total costs and expenses) declined to 81.1 percent in 
that year over the 1995 base year. After experiencing moderate growth since then, due to 
declining total operating costs and expenses, gross operating profit in 2000 increased to 
108.8 percent over the 1995 base year, more slowly than did growth o f  total revenue.
Other expenses, which constitute corporation fees and internal maintenance fees, 
such as internal information systems, have increased rapidly over the base period. In 
2000, other expenses increased by 194.1 percent. Non-operating expenses declined to 7.6 
percent o f  1995 base year. However, non-operating expenses for aggregate Atlantic City 
casinos jum ped to 293.6 percent in 1999 over the base period, due to a dram atic increase 
in expenses by both the Claridge and the Trump Plaza, significantly affecting the 
declining EBITDA and net income before income taxes and extraordinary items for the 
year. Non-operating expenses declined to 41.4 percent in 2000 over the base period. The 
EBITDA of Atlantic City casinos has increased gradually since 1996, except for a 
significant decline in 1999, due to high non-operating expenses that year. In 2000, 
EBITDA increased to 104.4 percent over the base period, slow er than growth o f  total 
revenue.
Depreciation and amortization has seen a rapid increase since 1995. However, 
since 1998, it declined from 123.2 percent in 1998 to 120.0 percent in 1999, and to 110.2
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percent in 2000. Interest expenses increased by 117.9 percent in 2000 over the base 
period, after experiencing decline from 1996 to 1998.
In 1996, net income before income taxes and extraordinary items declined 10.0 
percent from 1995, due to a  significant increase in total operating costs and expenses 
caused by fierce market competition for players. Atlantic City casinos have generated 
gradually increasing net income before income taxes and extraordinary items since then. 
In 2000, net income before income taxes and extraordinary items experienced moderate 
growth (70.4 percent over the base period) after the serious net loss o f 1999, caused by 
huge non-operating expenses.
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Table 13
Horizontal Analysis o f  Aggregate Income Statements o f  Atlantic C ity Casinos
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2(XX)
R evenues
G am ing 100.0 101.6 103.1 106.3 109.6 112.9
Room s 100.0 109.4 113.3 119.8 122.5 121.7
F ood  and  B everage 100.0 105.5 107.5 110.4 111.9 113.8
O ther 100.0 109.1 121.5 122.8 122.4 117.3
T otal R evenue 100.0 102.6 104.6 1073) 1103) 113.6
Less: P rom otional A llow ances 100.0 110.6 113.4 116.2 119.6 119.6
N et R evenues 100.0 101.6 103.5 106.9 109.8 1123)
C osts and E xpenses:
C o st o f  G oods and  Serv ices 100.0 107.4 111.9 113.8 114.9 116.8
Selling. G enera l, and  A dm inistrative 100.0 109.7 100.5 101.9 107.0 107.9
Provision fo r D oubtful A ccounts 100.0 126.1 140.4 209.1 248.6 160.8
T otal O perating C osts and Expenses 100.0 108.3 108.4 110.5 113.2 114.2
G ross O perating P rofit 100.0 81.1 88.7 95.8 99.6 108.8
O th er E xpenses 100.0 140.1 143.3 153.5 187.8 194.1
N on-operating  E xpenses 100.0 7.6 21.0 16.3 293.6 41.4
EBITDA 100.0 79.8 87.4 95.0 77.5 104.4
D epreciation  and  A m ortization 100.0 106.7 108.0 123.2 120.0 110.2
In terest E xpense 100.0 98.8 96.8 97.8 113.3 117.9
N et Incom e (L oss) B efore Incom e T axes 100.0 10.0 44.3 56.1 -44.0 70.4
& extraordinary item s.
Note. From “Annual Report,” by New Jersey Casino Control Commission ( 1995 — 2000). 
All items are expressed as a  percentage based on every item o f  1995.
Unit Analysis
Figure 5 shows that daily win per table o f  Atlantic City casinos has increased each 
year since 1997. W hile Atlantic City casinos’ numbers o f  table gam es increased from 
1,368 in 1995 to 1,488 in 1997, their daily win per table decreased from $2,354 in 1995
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to $2,179 in 1997, the lowest o f the m ost recent 6 years. However, this increased to 
$2,559 in 2000, while the number o f  table games in Atlantic City decreased to 1,298 in 
2000 from 1,488 in 1997. Although the num ber o f  table game in Atlantic City decreased, 
daily win per table has seen rapid increases since 1997.
Trend of Table WInAJniVDay
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Figure 5. Daily Win Per Table o f  Atlantic City Casinos
Figure 6 shows that daily win per slot o f  Atlantic City casinos has decreased each 
year since 1995, from $250 in 1995 to $219 in 1999. However, daily win per slot o f 
Atlantic City casinos jum ped, in 2000, to $233. The number o f slots in Atlantic City 
increased from 28,323 in 1995 to 36,237 in 2000. Slot win revenue for Atlantic City 
casinos has increased from $257.9 m illion in 1995 to $308.7 million in 2000, which 
accounted for approximately 73 percent o f  total gaming revenue in Atlantic City in 2000.
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Figure 6. Daily W in Per Slot o f  Atlantic City Casinos
Summary
Within revenue distributions for A tlantic City casinos, gaming revenue has 
accounted for approximately 8 1 - 8 2  percent o f  total revenue since 1995, while non­
gaming revenue has accounted for less than 20 percent o f  total revenue. For future 
success for Atlantic City casinos in highly com petitive markets, casino operators need to 
increase their numbers o f  non-gam ing entertainment options, and also increase the 
percentage o f travelers who com e by air, and the average lengths o f  stays o f  visitors.
Daily win per table o f  Atlantic City casinos has consistently increased since 1997, 
from $2,179 in 1997 to $2,559 in 2000, while the number o f table games decreased from 
1,488 in 1997 to 1.298 in 2000. Atlantic C ity’s daily win per slot has declined each year 
from an average win o f  $250 in 1995 to an average win o f $219 in 1999; however, this 
increased from $219 in 1999 to $233 in 2000. The number o f slot machines in Atlantic 
City has increased significantly, from 28,323 in 1995 to 36,237 in 2000. Slot revenues 
accounted for approximately 73 percent o f  gaming revenue in Atlantic City in 2000.
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Atlantic City casinos seem to be recovering from the fierce marketing w ar o f  
1996, when their total operating expenses increased significantly, and correspondingly, 
their net income before income taxes and extraordinary items declined from that o f  the 
previous year. Since 1997, their total operating costs and expenses as a  percentage o f 
total revenue have gradually declined, contributing to the increase o f EBIT D A  and net 
income before income taxes and extraordinary items. In 1999, however, there were very 
high non-operating expenses (3.3 percent o f total revenue), which caused a  significant 
decline o f  EBITDA and profit margin for the year. In 2000, Atlantic City casinos enjoyed 
m oderate growth in EBITDA and net income before income taxes and extraordinary 
items, continuing to decrease their total operating costs overall.
To achieve higher bottom-line profit margins, Atlantic City casinos should 
decrease their high interest expenses (approximately 9.0 percent o f total revenue), and 
also decrease other expenses, such as corporation and internal maintenance fees. Atlantic 
City casinos also need to more tightly control non-operating expenses.
Comparison o f  Large and Small Casinos on the Las Vegas Strip
This part o f  the chapter compares aggregate financial conditions and perform ance 
o f small casinos to those o f  large casinos on the Las Vegas Strip, in terms o f  vertical 
income statem ent analysis, ratio analysis, and unit analysis. Large and small casinos are 
categorized, based on criteria established within the Nevada Gaming Abstract (2000), 
which separates casinos on the Las Vegas Strip into two groups: 15 small casinos with 
annual gam ing revenues o f  $ 1 million to $72 million, and 22 large casinos with annual 
gam ing revenues o f  $72 million and over.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
Vertical Analysis
Table 14 illustrates 2000 aggregate income statements o f small and large casinos 
on the Las Vegas Strip, with each item shown as a percentage o f total revenue. Revenue 
distribution suggests that large casinos’ revenue centers were more diversified than were 
those o f  the small casinos, with sm aller amount o f  gaming revenue as a percentage o f 
total revenue. Large casinos’ revenues for rooms; food; and other departm ents, as 
percentages o f total revenue, were higher than small casinos’ revenues within those 
departments.
Combined cost o f  sales incurred by large casinos (6.7 percent o f  total revenue) 
was lower than those o f  small casinos (8.7 percent o f  total revenue). Com plim entary 
expenses o f  large casinos were slightly higher than those o f  small casinos by 0.1 percent 
o f  total revenue. Large casinos’ cost advantage was evident in payroll and related 
expenses o f  revenue centers (25.5 percent of total revenue), compared to small casinos’
31.9 percent o f total revenue. O ther departmental expenses o f  large casinos’ revenue 
centers, however, accounted for 27.3 percent o f total revenue, significantly higher than 
small casinos’ 22.2 percent. Large casinos’ cost advantage in cost o f  sales and payroll 
and related expenses o f revenue centers was offset by higher other departm ental expenses. 
As a  result, large casinos’ aggregate departmental income was only 3.3 percent better 
than that o f  small casinos.
Large casinos’ total overhead expenses before income taxes accounted for 36.2 
percent o f  total revenue, but 51.8 percent o f total revenue for small casinos. Primary 
contributors o f  the 15.6 percent difference were the small casinos’ m uch higher other 
general and administrative expenses; rent; and interest expenses as a  percentage o f total
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revenue. Small casinos were higher, by 8.2 percent o f  total revenue, in terms o f  o ther 
general and administrative expenses, such as corporate fees; management fees; and 
internal maintenance fees (such as internal information systems). Their rent and interest 
expenses were individually higher, by 3.3 percent and 1.6 percent of total revenue, than 
w ere those o f  large casinos. Small casinos’ greater expenses for advertising and 
prom otion; payroll for non-revenue centers; and depreciation and amortization also 
contributed to their high total overhead expenses before incom e taxes.
In 2000, departmental income o f the small casinos (37.2 percent o f  the total 
revenue) was only 3.3 percent below the large casinos’ 40.5 percent. After subtracting 
total overhead costs, however, small casinos had a net loss before income taxes and 
extraordinary items o f  15.2 percent o f  total revenue, while large casinos generated 3.4 
percent o f  total revenue in net income before taxes and extraordinary items. Small 
casinos fell behind 18.6 percent in net income before taxes and extraordinary item s. 
Prim ary contributors were small casinos’ significantly higher overhead expenses, and 
o ther general and administrative expenses in particular.
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Table 14
Vertical Analysis o f  Aggregate Income Statements o f  Small and Large Casinos 
on the Las Vegas Strip
Sm all C asinos Large C asinos
Total Revenue l(X).0 100.0
Gam ing 47_5 45.8
Rooms 21.8 23.5
Food 11.4 12.4
Beverage 6.8 4.7
O ther 12.5 13.6
C ost o f Sales 8.7 6.7
G ross Margin 91.3 93.3
Com plim entary expenses 9.0 9.1
Payroll and related expenses (revenue centers) 31.9 25.5
O ther departm ental expenses 13.8 19.1
Departmental income 36.6 39.6
Advertising &  promotion 2.9 2.7
Payroll and related expenses (non-revenue centers) 7.9 6.9
Depreciation and amortization 9.4 8.1
Rent 3.9 0.6
Interest expense 8.6 7.0
O ther general &  administrative expenses 19.1 10.9
Total overhead expenses before income taxes 51.8 36.2
Net income before income taxes and extraordinary items -15.2 3.4
Note. From “Nevada Gaming Abstract,” by Nevada State Gaming Control Board (2000). 
All items are expressed as a  percentage o f aggregate hotel-casinos’ total revenue.
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Ratio Analysis
Ratio Analysis is the com parison o f related facts and figures, most o f  w hich 
appear on financial statements. A ratio gives mathematical expression to a relationship 
between two figures, and is com puted by dividing one figure by another. Ratio analysis 
goes beyond the figures reported in a financial statement, making these figures m ore 
meaningful, informative and useful (Schmidgall, 1997). Therefore, the objective o f  ratio 
analysis is to generate indicators for evaluating various aspects o f  a financial situation.
For an in-depth analysis o f  the financial conditions and performance o f  sm all and 
large casinos on Las Vegas Strip, Table 15 provides ratios derived from aggregate 
income statements and balance sheets o f  the two groups o f  casinos. As shown by ratios o f 
total comp expense to gaming revenue, large casinos spent more on comps to attract 
people; large casinos spent 19.9 cents, from every dollar o f  gaming revenue, w hile small 
casinos spent 18.9 cents. Ratios o f total revenue to average total assets and total revenue 
less comp sales to average total assets indicate that the large casinos are m ore efficient at 
using assets to generate revenue than are small casinos.
Return on invested capital is the ratio o f income before income taxes and 
extraordinary items plus interest expense, divided by average assets, less average current 
liabilities. This represents return to equity and long-term debt. Return on average assets is 
income before income taxes and extraordinary items plus interest expense d iv ided  by 
average assets. It measures the return to total financing (Gu, 1999). The two ratios show 
that large casinos provided much better returns on equity than did small casinos. Large 
casinos was higher, by 11.1 percent, in return on invested capital, and generated 9.8 
percent more than small casinos in a  comparison o f return on average assets.
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Table 15
Ratios o f Small and Large Casinos on the Las V eeas Strip
R a tio s  S m a ll C a s in o s L a rg e  C a s in o s
I T o ta l C om plim en tary  E xpense to G am ing R evenue 18.9% 19.9%
2 T o ta l R evenue to  A verage Total Assets 53 .6% 60.2%
3 T o ta l R evenue L ess C om p Sales to A verage T o ta l Assets 49 .0% 55.1%
4 R eturn  on Invested  C apita l -3 .9% 7.2%
5 R eturn  on  A verage  A ssets -3.6% 6.2%
Note. From “N evada Gaming Abstract,” by the Nevada State G am ing Control Board 
(2000).
Unit Analysis
To com pare the daily win per table and daily win per slot o f  small and large 
casinos on the Las Vegas Strip, unit analysis is used in this study. Figure 7 shows that 
large casinos have had much higher daily win per table than have sm all casinos ever 
since 1995. Daily win per table o f large casinos has declined since 1995, however, from 
$3,073 in 1995 to $2,751 in 2000. In 2000, daily win per table o f  large casinos was 
$2,751, more than three times that o f  small casinos’, $820. Daily w in per table o f small 
casinos has also declined each year since 1997, from average win o f  $1,106 in 1997 to an 
average win o f  $820 in 2000. In 2000, the num ber o f table gam es in large casinos on the 
Las Vegas Strip increased by 740 since 1995. from 1,518 in 1995 to 2,258 in 2000, due to 
openings o f  7 m ega hotel-casinos during this tim e. The num ber o f  table games in small 
casinos has decreased by 96 since 1995, from 506 in 1995 to 407 in 2000.
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Figure 7. Daily Win Per Table o f Large and Small Casinos on the Las Vegas Strip
Figure 8 shows that daily win per slot o f  large casinos on the Las Vegas Strip has 
been much more efficient than that o f  small casinos. Neither group has changed 
significantly in its daily win per slot since 1995; the daily win per slot o f large casinos 
has been in the range o f  $104 and $ 1 1 5 , while that o f  small casinos has been in the range 
o f  $59 and $67 since 1995. Meanwhile, gaps between large and small casinos’ daily win 
per slot were less than those o f daily win per table games in Figure 4. The numbers o f 
slot machines in large casinos on the Las Vegas Strip increased significantly, from 
36,191 in 1995 to 50,203 in 2000, due to openings o f  several hotel-casinos during this 
period, while the numbers o f slot machines in small casinos decreased, from 14,581 in 
1995 to 11,104 in 2000.
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Figure 8. Daily win per slot o f large and small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip
Comparison Between Large and Small Casinos in Atlantic C ity 
This part o f  the chapter compares aggregate financial performance o f  small 
casinos with that o f  large casinos in Atlantic C ity using the 2000 Annual Report, 
published by the New Jersey Casino Control Com m ission. The researcher separates 
casinos in Atlantic C ity into two groups: 5 small operations with annual gam ing revenues 
o f  less than $400 million and 7 large operations with annual gaming revenues o f  $400 
m illion and over in 2000. Since each category’s ratios involving balance sheet 
information and slot and table revenue per unit were not available, this part o f  the chapter 
investigates only vertical incom e statements o f  small and large casinos in Atlantic City.
Vertical Analvsis
Table 16 illustrates 2000 aggregate income statements o f large and small casinos 
in Atlantic City, with each item  shown as a percentage o f  total revenue. In revenue 
distribution, small casinos’ gaming revenue as a  percentage o f total revenue was higher
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than that o f  large casinos by 1.4 percent. Small casinos’ food and beverage revenue 
centers, 10.2 percent o f  total revenue, also had greater weights in total revenue than those 
o f  large casinos, 9.8 percent o f  total revenue. Large casinos’ higher rooms and other 
revenue centers accounted for the difference o f 1.8 percent o f  total revenue between 
small and large casinos. In com paring costs o f promotional allowances, small and large 
casinos in Atlantic City spent the same amounts o f  promotional allowance, 10.9 percent 
o f  total revenue, leading to the same net revenue o f  89.1 percent o f  total revenue.
In comparing total operating costs and expenses, this study found that small 
casinos spent significantly m ore on operating costs and expenses than did large casinos, 
by 10.3 percent o f  total revenue. Small casinos also had higher cost o f  goods and services, 
by 5.2 percent o f  total revenue, and higher selling, general, and adm inistrative expenses, 
by 5.0 percent o f  total revenue. Provision o f doubtful accounts o f  small casinos was also 
higher than that o f  large casinos, by 0.1 percent o f  total revenue.
Those significantly higher total operating costs and expenses incurred by small 
casinos resulted in gross operating profit by large casinos’ being much higher than that by 
small casinos’, by 10.3 percent; Large casinos’ gross operating profit as a  percentage o f 
total revenue was 25.5 percent, while that o f small casinos was 15.3 percent o f  total 
revenue. O ther expenses, w hich constitute corporation fees; internal maintenance fees; 
and other fees, when incurred by small casinos, were lower than large casinos by 0.8 
percent o f  total revenue. Sm all casinos spent 1.0 percent o f  total revenue for non­
operating expenses, which w ere nearly zero for large casinos.
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EBITDA o f  large casinos was higher than that o f  small casinos by 10.4 percent o f 
total revenue. Large casinos, however, had higher depreciation and am ortization expenses 
than small casinos, by 0.6 percent o f  total revenue. Interest expenses incurred by large 
casinos, 9.5 percent o f  total revenue, were also higher than small casinos’ 9.1 percent o f  
total revenue.
As a result, net income (loss) before income taxes and extraordinary items o f 
large casinos was 6.9 percent, and that o f  small casinos was (2.5) percent. Large casinos’ 
net income before income taxes and extraordinary items was higher than that o f  small 
casinos by 9.4 percent o f  total revenue, while EBIT DA o f large casinos was higher than 
that o f  small casinos by 10.4 percent o f  total revenue. This means that large casinos had 
higher combined interest and depreciation and amortization expenses by 1.0 percent o f 
total revenue. The primary contributor to this difference in net income before income 
taxes and extraordinary items, 9.4 percent o f  total revenue, between small and large 
casinos was due to small casinos’ significantly higher total costs and expenses.
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Table 16
A tla n tic  C itv
Sm all C asinos L arge C asinos
Revenues
Gaming 82.4 81.0
Rooms 5.4 6.5
Food and Beverage 10.2 9.8
Other 2.0 2.7
Total Revenue 100.0 100.0
Less: Promotional Allowances 10.9 10.9
Net Revenues 89.1 89.1
Costs and Expenses:
Cost o f Goods and Services 49.3 44.1
Selling, General, and Administrative 23.8 18.8
Provision for Doubtful Accounts 0.7 0.6
Total O perating Costs and Expenses 73.8 63.5
G ross O perating Profit IS J 25.6
Other Expenses 2.9 3.7
Non-operating Expenses 1.0 0.0
EBITDA 11.4 21.8
Depreciation and Amortization 4.8 5.4
Interest Expense 9.1 9.5
Net Income (Loss) Before Income Taxes & (2.5) 6.9
Extraordinary Items
Note. From “Annual Report,” by State o f New Jersey Casino Control Commission (2000). 
All items are expressed as a  percentage o f  aggregate hotel-casinos’ total revenue.
Sum m arv
In its comparison o f  financial perform ances o f large and small casinos on the Las 
Vegas Strip, this analysis shows that large casinos on the Las Vegas Strip were much 
more diversified in revenue distribution than w ere small casinos, with less contribution 
from gam ing revenue. Large casinos’ rooms, food, and other operations had greater
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weights in total revenue than those o f small casinos. In its comparison o f  total costs and 
expenses, this study determ ined that large casinos enjoyed an obvious cost advantage, 
w ith overall lower cost o f  sales, lower labor costs, and lower other general and 
adm inistrative expenses as a  percentage o f total revenue.
Total overhead expenses before income taxes incurred by small casinos were 
significantly higher than those o f  large casinos, by 15.6 percent o f  total revenue. Primary 
contributors were other general and administrative expenses: corporation fees; 
management fees; and internal maintenance fees, rent expenses, and labor expenses as 
percentages o f total revenue. Due to the cost advantage, large casinos could spend 0.1 
percent o f  total revenue more in complimentary expenses than could sm all casinos. Ratio 
analysis also provided evidence that large casinos had better financial performances.
Large casinos have had higher daily win per table and daily win per slot than 
small casinos even though the number o f slots and table games for large casinos has 
increased significantly since 1995, due to openings o f  several hotel-casinos during this 
period. Large casinos' daily win per slot and daily win per table have been more than 
double to small casinos since 1995. Because o f  large casinos' obvious cost advantage due 
to econom ies o f  scale, their net income before income taxes and extraordinary items was 
significantly higher than that o f  small casinos, by 18.6 percent o f  total revenue in 2000.
In Atlantic City, revenue distribution shows that large casinos’ rooms and other 
operations had greater weights in total revenue while small casinos had larger amount o f  
gam ing and food & beverage revenues as percentages o f  total revenue. Both groups spent 
the same amount o f  promotional allowances as a  percentage o f  total revenue. In 2000,
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however, total costs and expenses incurred by small casinos were significantly greater 
than those o f  large casinos by 10.3 percent o f  total revenue.
The obvious cost advantage o f large casinos led them to have a  h igher bottom-line 
profit margin, even though they spent 1.0 percent o f  total revenue more in com bined 
interest expenses, depreciation and amortization. W hile large casinos’ net incom e before 
income taxes and extraordinary items was 6.9 percent o f  total revenue, sm all casinos 
operated net loss o f  2.5 percent o f  total revenue in 2000. Small casinos’ significantly 
higher total costs and expenses, the primary contributor to their operations below 
breakeven, result from economies o f scale.
Com parison between the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City
This part o f  the chapter presents descriptive analysis for its com parison of 
financial performances o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos, in term s o f vertical 
income statement analysis; unit analysis; capacity analysis; and revenue per employee 
analysis. Through com parative analysis o f  casinos operations within A tlantic City and 
Las Vegas Strip casinos, this study investigates differences in financial perform ance and 
reasons for those differences.
Vertical Analvsis
Table 17 shows 2000 aggregate income statements for Atlantic C ity  and Las 
Vegas Strip casinos. Revenue distribution suggests that the Las Vegas S trip ’s revenue 
centers were much more diversified than those o f  Atlantic City, with sm aller contribution 
from gaming. Atlantic City casinos focused their revenue sources prim arily on gaming, 
81.6 percent o f  total revenue, while on the Las Vegas Strip, gaming revenue accounted
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for 45.9 percent o f total revenues. The 35.7 percent difference was made up with revenue 
from room s, food & beverage, and other revenue centers o f  the Las Vegas Strip. While 
room revenue was 6.0 percent o f  Atlantic City’s total revenue, room revenue on the Las 
Vegas Strip accounted for 23.3 percent o f total revenue. Food & beverage generated only
9.9 percent o f  Atlantic C ity’s total revenues, but 17.2 percent o f  Las Vegas S trip’s total 
revenues. Meanwhile, other revenue, for instance leases o f  malls and restaurants; 
entertainm ent shows; clubs; and spas, accounted for 2.5 percent o f Atlantic C ity’s total 
revenue and 13.5 percent o f  the Las Vegas Strip’s total revenue.
In 2000, Atlantic City casinos complied with Las Vegas Strip casinos in terms o f 
gaming revenue, but the total revenue o f Las Vegas Strip casinos was nearly double that 
o f  Atlantic City casinos, due to higher contributions o f non-gaming revenues on the Las 
Vegas Strip. According to Ader &  Lumpkins ( 1996), the fundamental reason for the 
disparity between Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos is these m arkets’ converse 
characteristics; Atlantic City is a  regional day- and ovemight-trip market, which 
primarily draws visitors from a 300-mile radius, while the Las Vegas Strip is a 
destination vacation market that surpasses even Orlando, Rorida, in terms o f  numbers o f 
visitors.
In comparing promotional allowances, o r complimentary expenses, Atlantic City 
was higher than the Las Vegas Strip by 1.8 percent; these accounted for 10.9 percent of 
total revenue in Atlantic City, but 9.1 percent o f  total revenue on the Las Vegas Strip. In 
other w ords, Atlantic City casinos had to give back 1.8 cents more than did Las Vegas 
Strip casinos, from every dollar o f  total revenue, to comp customers. This led to higher 
net revenue for the Las Vegas Strip by 1.8 percent o f  total revenue.
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Total operating costs and expenses incurred by Las V egas Strip casinos were 
significantly higher than those o f  Atlantic City casinos, by 5.8 percent o f  total revenue. 
Combined costs o f  goods and services, which include em ployee payroll, o f Las Vegas 
Strip casinos, 42.4 percent o f total revenue, offset total costs and expenses by spending 
4.0 percent below Atlantic City casinos’ 46.4  percent. Las Vegas Strip casinos, however, 
had significantly higher selling, general and administrative expenses, by 8.1 percent o f  
total revenue and 1.7 percent o f  total revenue in bad debt expenses, or provision for 
doubtful accounts. Selling, general, and administrative expenses o f  Las Vegas Strip 
casinos were prim ary contributor to their higher total costs and expenses.
Correspondingly, gross operating profit, that is, net revenue minus total operating 
costs and expenses, o f  Atlantic City casinos was higher than that o f  Las Vegas Strip 
casinos by 3.9 percent o f total revenue. O ther expenses o f A tlantic City casinos, 3.8 
percent o f  total revenue, accounted for non-operating expenses, investment and related 
expenses, and internal maintenance fees. The EBITDA o f Atlantic City casinos, 17.2 
percent was, however, slightly higher than that o f Las Vegas Strip casinos, 17.1 percent, 
due to Atlantic C ity casinos’ higher o ther expenses.
Depreciation and amortization o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos was significantly higher 
than that o f A tlantic City casinos by 3.1 percent o f total revenue. Atlantic City casinos, 
however, had higher interest expenses by 2.2 percent o f  total revenue. As a result, net 
income before incom e taxes and extraordinary items in A tlantic City was higher than that 
o f  the Las Vegas Strip by 1.0 percent o f  total revenue: net incom e before income taxes 
and extraordinary items o f Atlantic City casinos was 2.8 percent o f  total revenue, but 1.8 
percent o f  total revenue on the Las Vegas Strip.
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To increase net income before income taxes and extraordinary items for A tlantic 
City, casino operators would need to decret se their high promotional allowances, costs o f 
goods and sales, and interest expenses in particular, thus better diversifying their revenue 
centers. They have had very high interest expenses, approximately 9.0 percent o f  total 
revenue, considering that Las Vegas Strip casinos’ interest expenses increased 
significantly with the changes in the casino accounting method in 2000. Las Vegas Strip 
casinos should aim to decrease operating costs and expenses in selling, general, and 
administrative, and bad debt expenses to yield better profit margins. Las Vegas Strip 
casinos’ high depreciation and amortization, 8.2 percent o f  total revenue, also lowered 
their net income before income taxes and extraordinary items.
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Table 17
Casinos
($ in Thousands) A tlan tic  C ity  
D ollars Percent
Las V egas S trip  
D ollars Percen t
Revenues:
Gaming 4.223.337 81.6 4.683.729 45.9
Rooms 311.581 6.0 2.380.444 23.3
Food & Beverage 514.450 9.9 1.758.655 17.2
Other 126.282 2.5 1.372.842 13.5
Total Revenues 5,175,650 100.0 10,195,670 100.0
Less: Promotional Allowance 565,464 10.9 926342 9.1
Net Revenues 4,610,186 89.1 9 3 6 9 3 2 8 903»
Costs and Expenses:
Cost o f  Goods and Services 2.40Z871 46.4 4.324.654 42.4
Selling. General, and Administrative 1.087.286 21.0 2.964.671 29.1
Provision for Doubtful Accounts 32.396 0.6 238.879 2.3
Total O perating Costs and Expenses 3 3 2 2 4 5 3 68.0 7 3 2 8304 73.8
G ross O perating Profit 1,087,633 21.0 1,741,124 17.1
Other Expenses 197.223 3.8 - -
EBITDA 890,410 17.2 1,741424 17.1
Depreciation and Amortization 265.446 5.1 831.860 8.2
Interest Expense 480.960 9.3 723.813 7.1
Net Incom e (Loss) Before Income Taxes 144,004 2.8 185.450 1 3
& Extraordinary Items
Note. From  “Annual Report,” by State o f New Jersey Casino Control Commission 
(2000). “N evada Gaming Abstract,” by State o f  Nevada Gam ing Control Board (2000). 
All percents are expressed as a  percentage o f aggregate hotel-casinos’ total revenue.
Figure 9 shows trends in total operating costs and expenses o f  Atlantic City and 
Las V egas Strip casinos since 1995. In 1996, A tlantic C ity casinos’ total operating costs 
and expenses increased by 3.8 percent o f  total revenue, due to their periodic marketing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
w ar that consisted o f  bus and coin giveaway packages, while Las Vegas Strip casinos 
decreased their total operating costs and expenses by 1.6 percent o f total revenue over 
previous year. Since then, however, total costs and expenses o f  Las Vegas Strip casino 
operations have increased each year while those o f Atlantic C ity  casinos have 
consistently decreased annually. Correspondingly, gaps in total costs and expenses o f  
operating Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos, respectively, have been widening 
since 1997. In 2000, Las Vegas Strip casinos’ total operating costs and expenses were 
m uch higher than those o f  Atlantic City, by 5.8 percent o f  total revenues.
Trend of Total Coat» and  Expenaes
a
1
Atlantic City Las Vegas Strip
19961995 1999 2000
Figure 9. Total Costs and Expenses o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Figure 10 shows trends in EBITDA for Atlantic City and  Las Vegas Strip casinos 
since 1995. Las Vegas Strip casinos’ EBITDA, as a percentage o f  total revenue, has 
declined each year since 1996, while that o f  Atlantic City casinos has increased since 
then, contrary to the trend o f  total costs and expenses shown in Figure 9. The sudden drop
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in EBITD A  for Atlantic City casinos in 1999 was definitely due to the dramatic increase 
in non-operating expenses in the Claridge and Trum p Plaza, 3.3 percent o f  total revenue. 
The EBIT DA o f Las Vegas Strip casinos has been higher than that o f  Atlantic C ity since 
1995; however, in 2000, the EBIT DA o f  Atlantic City, 17.2 percent o f  total revenue, was 
slightly higher than that o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos. 17.1 percent o f total revenue.
I  Trend of EBITDA !
Las Vegas StripAtlantic City
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
I_______________________________________________^ ___________________________________
Figure 10. EBITDA o f Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Figure 11 shows trends in profit margin, net income before income taxes and 
extraordinary items, o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos since 1995. The profit 
margin o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos has significantly decreased since 1996, especially in 
1999 and 2000, when several m ajor hotel-casinos opened on the Las Vegas Strip. On the 
other hand, the profit margin o f  Atlantic City casinos has gradually increased since 1996, 
from 0.4  percent as total revenue in 1996 to 2.8 percent as total revenue in 2000. The
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sudden decline in profit margin for Atlantic City in 1999 was due to significantly 
increased non-operating expenses for the Claridge and the Trump Plaza.
The increase in total operating costs and expenses o f Las V egas Strip casinos, 
shown in Figure 9, has led to a decline in profit margin on the Las Vegas Strip, while 
Atlantic City has generated gradually increasing profit margins since 1996, primarily due 
to declining total costs and expenses since then. Gaps in the profit margins o f Atlantic 
City and Las Vegas Strip casinos, respectively, from 1995 to 1998, have been much 
wider than EBITDA gaps between the two respective markets during the same period. 
This means A tlantic City casinos have had more than double the com bined interest and 
depreciation and am ortization expenses during this period.
Trend of Profit Margin»*
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Figure 11. Profit M argins o f Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip  casinos 
*Net income (loss) before income taxes and extraordinary items.
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Unit Analvsis
Figure 12 shows trends in daily win per table o f  Atlantic C ity  and Las Vegas Strip 
casinos since 1995. Each market has had higher daily  w in per table gam e in turn since 
1995. In 1995, daily win per table game of A tlantic C ity casinos was $2,354 while that o f  
Las Vegas Strip casinos was $2,521. In 2000, how ever, Atlantic C ity  casinos had higher 
daily  win per table game than did Las Vegas S trip  casinos, by an average win o f  $104; 
Atlantic C ity casinos' daily table win per unit w as $2,559 while it w as $2,455 on the Las 
Vegas Strip. The number o f table games in A tlantic C ity decreased from  1,368 in 1995 to 
1,298 in 2000, while these increased significantly on the Las Vegas Strip from 2,024 in 
1995 to 2,668 in 2000, due to openings o f several hotel-casinos during that period.
Trend of Table WIn/Unlt/Oay
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Figure 12. Daily Win Per Table game o f  A tlantic City and Las Vegas Strip 
Casinos
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In its com parison o f  daily win per slot o f  Atlantic City casinos with that o f  Las 
Vegas Strip casinos as shown in Figure 13, this study found that Atlantic C ity casinos 
have generated m uch higher daily win per slot than have Las Vegas Strip casinos. Daily 
win per slot o f  A tlantic City casinos has declined each year since 1995, from an average 
win o f $250 in 1995 to an average win of $219 in 1998 and 1999; however, it increased 
to $233 in 2000, which was more than double that o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos, $106. On 
the Las Vegas Strip, daily win per slot has consistently increased each year since 1996, 
from $92 in 1996 to $ 106 in 2000. The total number o f  slot machines in Atlantic City 
increased significantly from 28,323 in 1995 to 36,237 in 2000 and on the Las Vegas Strip 
from 50,772 in 1995 to 61,307 in 2000.
Trend of Slot Wln/UnltfDay
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Figure 13. Daily Win Per Slot o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip Casinos
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Capacity Analysis
Capacity analysis is used in this study to compare room, table, and slot capacities 
o f Atlantic City with those o f  the Las Vegas Strip. These capacities are based on the 
number o f visitors and average number o f  stayed nights in each market. M eanwhile, the 
average num ber o f  stayed nights in Atlantic City was not available. Since approximately 
80 percent o f  A tlantic City visitor are day-trippers (M iller & Association, Inc., 2000), this 
study supposed the average number o f stayed nights for Atlantic City visitors to be 1.0. 
Table 18 shows rooms, slot, and table game capacity o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip 
casinos, respectively, based on the methodology discussed in Chapter 3.
Table 18
Capacities o f Rooms. Slots, and Table Gam es in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip
Rooms Capacity Slot Capacity Table Capacity
AC LVS AC LVS AC LVS
1995 0.1006 0.1943 0.3107 0.1824 0.0150 0.0073
1996 0.1086 0.1815 0.3343 0.1739 0.0151 0.0071
1997 0.1154 0.2006 0.3600 0.1830 0.0159 0.0075
1998 0.1251 0.2231 0.3768 0.1997 0.0155 0.0083
1999 0.1265 0.1899 0.4018 0.1751 0.0152 0.0074
2000 0.1245 0.1991 0.3986 0.1687 0.0143 0.0073
Figure 14 show s trends in room capacity for Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip 
casinos since 1995. Room capacity on the Las Vegas Strip has been higher than that o f  
Atlantic City since 1995. In 2000, the ratio o f  rooms to visitors for the Las Vegas Strip 
was 0.1991, and 0.1245 for Atlantic City. Room capacities o f  Atlantic City casinos have 
gradually increased since 1995, except for a  minute decline in 2000. Room capacities for
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Las Vegas Strip casinos have significantly increased from 1996 to 1998; however, these 
decreased in 1999, due to greater availability o f  rooms, caused by several hotel-casinos’ 
openings during the period. This increased the num ber o f available room s on the Las 
Vegas Strip by more than 5,000,000 during that year.
 T ren d  of R oom  C ap ac ity
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Figure 14. Room Capacities o f Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip  Casinos
Figure 15 shows trends in slot capacities o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip 
casinos since 1995. Slot capacity in Atlantic C ity has increased each year since 1995, 
resulting in much higher slot capacity than the Las Vegas Strip. In 2000, the ratio o f slots 
to visitors in Atlantic C ity w as 0.3986, but 0.1687 on the Las Vegas Strip. The greater 
availability o f  slots, due to openings o f several hotel-casinos on the Las Vegas Strip in 
1999 and 2000, caused a decline in the Las Vegas Strip’s slot capacity since 1998. In 
2000, the num ber o f  slot machines on the Las Vegas Strip was 6 1,307 while Atlantic City 
had 36,237.
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Trend of Slot Capacity
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Figure 15. Slot Capacities o f Atlantic C ity and Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Figure 16 shows trends in table game capacity for Atlantic City and Las Vegas 
Strip casinos since 1995. Table game capacity in Atlantic City casinos has been higher 
than that in Las Vegas Strip casinos since 1995. Table game capacity o f  Atlantic City 
casinos has decreased each year since 1997, w hile that o f  Las Vegas Strip casinos has 
decreased each year since 1998, along with the openings o f several hotel-casinos on the 
Las Vegas Strip. In 2000, the ratio o f table gam es to visitors to the Las Vegas Strip was 
0.0073 while the ratio o f tables to every visitor to Atlantic City was 0.0143.
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Trend of Table Capacity
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Figure 16. Table Game Capacities o f  Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Revenue per Employee Analysis 
Figure 17 shows trends in revenue per employee o f Atlantic City and Las Vegas 
Strip casinos since 1995. Revenue per employee was calculated each year by dividing 
total revenue by the total number o f  employees. Figure 17 shows that revenue per 
em ployee in Atlantic City has been higher than that in the Las Vegas Strip since 1995. 
The reason for this difference in revenues per employee is that the Las Vegas Strip has 
had more than twice the number o f  em ployees in non-gaming revenue centers, such as 
rooms, restaurants, and entertainment, than has Atlantic City.
In 1999, there was a significant increase in the number o f  employees on the Las 
Vegas Strip due to openings o f several hotel-casinos that year. This caused a  decline in 
revenue per employee for the year for the Las Vegas Strip, yielding much lower revenue 
per employee than Atlantic City. In 2000, Atlantic City casinos’ revenue per employee 
was $108,805 while revenue per em ployee was $103,434 on the Las Vegas Strip.
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Trend of Revenue/Employee
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Figure 17. Revenue Per Employee o f Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip Casinos
Summary
The significant difference between Atlantic City and Las Vegas Strip casinos in 
financial performance was that Las Vegas Strip casinos were much more diversified than 
Atlantic City casinos in revenue distributions, with sm aller contributions from gam ing 
revenue centers. Despite com parable gaming revenues, Atlantic C ity’s overall revenues 
were much lower than those o f  the Las Vegas Strip due to Atlantic C ity’s significantly 
low er proportion o f non-gaming revenues; in 2000, non-gaming revenues in A tlantic City 
accounted for approximately 18.4 percent o f  total revenue, while these accounted for 
approxim ately 54.0 percent o f  total revenue on the Las Vegas Strip.
In its comparison o f  total operating costs and expenses, the results o f  this study 
indicate that Las Vegas Strip casinos should low er their bad debt and selling, general, and 
adm inistrative expenses in comparison with those o f Atlantic City casinos. A tlantic City 
casinos have made progress in controlling their total operating costs and expenses since
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
1996, when there was a  fierce marketing w ar took place, consisting o f  bus and coin 
giveaway packages. Atlantic City should, however, still lower their high promotional 
allowance and interest expenses as a  percentage o f  total revenue. Atlantic C ity  had to 
give back 1.8 cents more than did the Las Vegas Strip o f  every dollar o f  total revenue to 
com p custom ers in 2000. In particular, high interest expenses o f Atlantic C ity casinos 
have significantly lowered their bottom-line profit margins since 1995.
In its com parison o f daily win per table game o f  Atlantic City with that o f the Las 
Vegas Strip, this study found that daily win per table game for both markets have seen 
com parable since 1995. Daily win per table was $2,559 in Atlantic City and $2,455 on 
the Las Vegas Strip in 2000. Atlantic City, however, has had significantly higher daily 
win per slot than the Las Vegas Strip since 1995. In 2000, Atlantic C ity’s daily win per 
slot was $233, but $106 on the Las Vegas Strip.
Capacity analysis, based on the num ber o f visitors and average stayed nights, for 
each market’s rooms, slots, and table gam es shows, that the Las Vegas Strip has had a 
higher ratio o f  rooms to visitors while Atlantic City has had a higher ratio o f  slots and 
table games to visitors since 1995. From its revenue per employee analysis, this study 
found that every employee in Atlantic C ity has generated higher revenue per employee 
than has the Las Vegas Strip since 1995. In 2000, every employee in A tlantic City 
generated revenue o f  $108,805 while an employee on the Las Vegas Strip generated an 
average revenue o f  $ 103,434.
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Trends and Stability o f Gaming W ins o f Slots versus Table Games 
The SPSS program was utilized to conduct the sim ple linear regression analysis 
for exam ining gam ing win revenue trends and stability o f  Atlantic City and the Las 
Vegas Strip casinos, respectively, with deseasonalized gam ing revenues as the dependent 
variable and tim e as the independent variable. Table 19 show s regression results for win 
revenues o f  slots and table gam es on the Las Vegas Strip in terms o f  four games: 
blackjack; baccarat; quarter slots; and dollar slots, the four leading gaming revenue 
generators on the Las Vegas Strip since 1991. Table 20 shows change rates o f  win 
revenues o f the four m ajor games on the Las Vegas Strip, regression results after log on 
each win revenues.
In linear regression analysis, the goodness o f fit o f  the model is measured by R" 
statistics, which tells the percentage o f  variance in the dependant variable that can be 
explained by the independent variable. “F-statistics” is also a useful measure o f  statistical 
reliability o f  the regression. The large F and R~ values associated with the model indicate 
that the regression model was validated with a  high statistical significance for all tested 
games. The higher R~ in the regression results for the each gam e’s win revenues is 
associated with more stable and predictable win revenues, while the higher slope b  is 
associated with higher revenue growth trends.
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Table 19
The Regression Results for the Las V esas Strip
Constant a ($) Slope b ($) R- F S igF
I Blackjack 35,276.245* 208.22* 67.99 25069 5.78E-31
2 Baccarat 26,113.298* 190.56* 18.17 26.20 1.21E-06
3 Quarter Slot 47,341.153* 308.22* 89.88 1,047.68 1.58E-60
4 Dollar Slot 39,481.704* 147.86* 68.47 256.28 2.33E-31
N ote: * p< .01, $ in thousands
Regression results o f  blackjack win revenues show that they had a  higher growth 
trend and m ore stable win revenues than baccarat win revenues; the growth trend for 
blackjack win revenues was $208,220, while that o f  baccarat win revenues was $190,560. 
Figure 18 show s the regression result o f  blackjack win revenues on the Las Vegas Strip, 
while the regression result o f  baccarat win revenues is shown in Figure 19.
Regression results o f quarter slot win revenues on the Las Vegas Strip show that 
these had a higher revenue growth trend and more stabilized revenues than did dollar slot 
win revenues. The revenue growth trend for quarter slots was $308,220 while that for 
dollar slots was $147,860. Table 20 shows change rates o f win revenues for the four 
m ajor gam es on the Las Vegas Strip. They are logged win revenues regressed against 
tim e, and the slope may imply average m onthly growth rate. Baccarat had the highest 
change rate, 0.00285, among them, while dollar slot had the lowest change rate, 0.00138.
Figure 20 shows the regression result o f  quarter slot win revenues, and Figure 21 
shows the regression result o f  dollar slot win revenues on the Las Vegas Strip. In its 
com parison o f  the trend and stability o f  blackjack win revenues with quarter slots win 
revenues on the Las Vegas Strip, this study found that quarter slot win revenues, which
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here represent slot win revenues, had more stable revenues and a  higher revenue growth 
trend than did blackjack games, which represent table win revenues.
Table 20
Change Rate o f  G am ing W in Revenues on the Las Vegas Strip
Blackjack Baccarat Quarter Slot Dollar Slot
Change Rate (AR) 0.00187* 0.00285* 0.00211* 0.00138*
N ote: * p< .0 1
Table 2 1 shows revenue growths for blackjack and baccarat on the Las Vegas 
Strip during the 1991 base year. Blackjack win revenues, associated w ith high R "of 67.99 
percent in the regression results, have seen stable increases, while baccarat win revenues, 
associated with low R" o f  18.17 percent and relatively high change rate, have seen 
unstable increases; baccarat wins increased significantly to 188.3 percent in 1995, but 
declined to 169.3 percent in 2000 during the 1991 base year. Table 22 shows that the 
quarter and dollar slot wins associated with high R~ in the regression results have seen 
stable increases, from 1991 through 2000.
Table 21
Table Games W in Revenues on the Las Vegas Strip
Blackjack Win 
(S in thousands)
Growth
(%)
Baccarat Win 
(S in thousands)
Growth
(%)
Total Table Win 
(S in thousands)
Growth
(%)
1991 459,880 100.0 316,059 100.0 1603,742 lOO.O
1995 553,891 120.4 595,078 188.3 1,862,745 142.9
2000 744,634 161.9 535,195 169.3 2690,355 1836
Note. From “Gam ing Revenue Report,” by Nevada State Gam ing Control Board.
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Table 22
Slots Win Revenues on the Las V esas Strip
0.25 Slot Win 
($ in thousands)
Growth
(%)
1.00 Slot Win 
(S in thousands)
Growth
(%)
Total Slots Win 
($ in thousands)
Growth
(%)
1991 563,145 100.0 457,745 lOO.O 1,339,180 lOO.O
1995 783,135 139.1 617,615 134.9 1,728,904 129.1
2000 979,573 173.9 679,140 148.4 2680,019 177.7
Note. Frotn “Gam ing Revenue Report,” by the Nevada State Gaming Control Board 
(19 9 1, 1995, and 2000).
Table 23 shows regression results o f  slot and table win revenues for A tlantic C ity 
casinos. Aggregate table win revenues for Atlantic City casinos were associated with 
significantly low er F and R" in comparison w ith aggregate slot win revenues. Slot win 
revenues had much more stabilized revenues than did table win revenues, with 
significantly higher R“. Slot win revenues also had a significantly higher growth trend 
than did table win revenues; the predicted table revenue growth trend was 594,000 while 
the slot revenue growth trend was $905,000. Table 24 shows change rates o f win 
revenues o f  slots and table games in Atlantic City. They are logged win revenues 
regressed against time, and the slope may imply average m onthly growth rate. The 
change rate o f  slot win revenues was higher than that o f table win revenues.
Figure 22 shows the regression result o f  table win revenues, deviating 
substantially from the predicted table revenue line, with low R~ o f  23.82 percent, while 
Figure 23 show s the regression result o f  slot win revenues, highly concentrated on the 
predicted slot revenue line, with high R“ o f  92.05 percent.
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Table 23
Regression Results for Atlantic City
Constant a  ($) Slope b ($) R- F SigF
I Table Wins 91.273* 0.094* 23.82 36.89 I.57E-08
2 Slots Wins 155.963* 0.905* 92.05 1,366.99 9.82E-67
Note: * p< .01, $ in million.
Table 24
Change Rate o f  Gam ing W in Revenues in Atlantic C ity
_____________________ Table Wins_________ Slot Wins
Change Rate (AR) 0.000422*_________ 0.001923*
Note: * p< .01
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Figure 18. Regression result o f  Blackjack revenues on the Las Vegas Strip 
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Figure 19. Regression result o f  Baccarat revenues on the Las Vegas Strip
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Figure 20. Regression result o f (Quarter Slot revenues on the Las Vegas Strip 
*S in thousands.
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Figure 21. Regression result o f  D ollar Slot revenues on the Las Vegas Strip 
*S in thousands
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Figure 22. Regression resuit o f  table revenues in A tlantic C ity *$ in millions.
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Figure 23. Regression result o f  slot revenues in Atlantic C ity *S in millions
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CHAPTERS
SUM M ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
There have been significant declines in net income before income taxes and 
extraordinary items on the Las Vegas Strip since 1996. In Atlantic City, net income 
before income taxes and extraordinary items declined dramatically in 1996, but has 
improved gradually since then. The main purpose o f this study has been to assess the 
state o f the casino industry in the two m ajor U.S. markets o f  the Las Vegas Strip and 
Atlantic City, based on recent changes in their respective financial performances. Casino 
performances in the two markets were compared. Furthermore, this study investigated 
whether there are economies o f  scale in the gaming industry by com paring operations o f 
large and small casinos in the two markets. Finally, win revenues o f slots versus table 
games in Atlantic City and on the Las Vegas Strip were examined in terms o f  trends and 
stability.
To achieve this study’s objectives, aggregated data o f 37 casinos on the Las 
Vegas Strip and that o f  12 casinos in Atlantic City were used in analyzing each market 
and comparing the two. For a  comparison o f  financial performances o f  large and small 
casinos. Las Vegas Strip casinos were separated into two groups based on annual gaming 
revenue in 2000: 22 large casinos and 15 small casinos. In Atlantic City, 5 casinos with
104
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annual gaming revenue o f  $400 million and over were categorized as large, while 7 
casinos with annual gam ing revenue o f less than $400 million were categorized as small.
The results and findings o f  Chapter 4  were developed into six parts as follows:
(1) Las Vegas Strip casinos; (2) Atlantic City casinos; (3) com parison between large and 
small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip; (4) com parison between large and small casinos in 
Atlantic City; (5) com parison between the Las Vegas Strip and Atlantic City; and (6) 
trends and stability o f  gam ing wins o f  slots versus table games.
Las Vegas Strip casinos have grown rapidly since 1995 in term s o f  revenues and 
num ber o f visitors. Non-gaming revenue sources, such as rooms, food, beverage, and 
other revenue centers, have increased in importance to drive revenues higher, while 
gaming as a  percentage o f  total revenue declined by 7.9 percent in 2000 from 1995. 
Despite the fast rising revenue on the Las Vegas Strip, however, total costs and expenses 
have increased faster than total revenue and have caused a decline in net income before 
income taxes and extraordinary items for Las Vegas Strip casinos since 1996. Primary 
contributors to the declining profit margins were a  significant increase in other general 
and administrative expenses: management fees; corporation fees; and internal 
maintenance fees, interest expenses, and depreciation and am ortization, especially in 
1999 and 2000, when several hotel-casinos opened on the Las Vegas Strip.
Atlantic C ity experienced a  periodic m arketing war that consisted o f bus and coin 
giveaway packages in 1996 (Rutherford, 1999), which significantly contributed to an 
increase in total operating costs and expenses, and a decline in the bottom-line profit 
margin for the year. Since then, Atlantic City casinos have seen declining ratios o f  total 
costs and expenses and correspondingly increasing profit margins as a  percentage o f  total
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revenue. In 1999, Atlantic City casinos generated a net loss o f 1.8 percent o f  total 
revenue, primarily due to huge non-operating expenses for the year. In 2000, however, 
A tlantic C ity casinos seemed to improve with m oderate growth in EBITDA and net 
incom e before income taxes and extraordinary items, continuing to lower their total costs 
and expenses as a percentage o f  total revenue.
In the comparison o f  operations o f large casinos with those o f  small casinos in 
A tlantic C ity  and on the Las Vegas Strip, there w ere significant differences betw een large 
and sm all casinos. Large casinos had more diversified revenue distributions than small 
casinos, w ith lesser contributions from gaming revenue centers. Large casinos also 
enjoyed an obvious cost advantage, with significantly lower costs and expenses incurred 
for their overall operations. Because o f large casinos’ obvious cost advantages, due to 
econom ies o f scale, their ratios o f  net income before income taxes and extraordinary 
items w as significantly higher than that o f small casinos in both markets.
In comparing o f casino operations on the Las Vegas Strip with those o f  Atlantic 
City, this study found that Las Vegas Strip casinos have had more diversified revenue 
distributions than have Atlantic City casinos since 1995, with fewer contributions from 
gam ing. Meanwhile, Las Vegas Strip casinos have had higher bad debt expenses and 
selling, general, and administrative expenses as a  percentage o f total revenue, while 
A tlantic C ity casinos had higher promotional allowances and interest expenses as a 
percentage o f  total revenue. Despite the comparable daily win per table gam e, the Las 
V egas S trip has had lower daily win per slot than Atlantic City since 1995. In 2000, 
A tlantic C ity’s daily win per slot was S233, while daily win per slot was only S 106 on the 
Las V egas Strip. Capacity analysis showed that the Las Vegas Strip has had a  higher ratio
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o f  rooms to every visitor, while Atlantic City has had a higher ratio o f slots and tables to 
every visitor since 1995.
Trends and stability o f  win revenues o f  slots versus table games in Atlantic City 
and on the Las Vegas Strip were exam ined by using the simple linear regression model. 
Each win revenue o f four m ajor games: blackjack; baccarat; quarter slots; and dollar slots, 
was exam ined for the Las Vegas Strip, while aggregate win revenues o f slots and table 
gam es were examined for Atlantic City. Regression results showed that slots win 
revenues from quarter and dollar slots on the Las Vegas Strip had a higher revenue 
growth trend and more stabilized revenues than did win revenues for two m ajor table 
games: blackjack and baccarat. In Atlantic City, aggregate slot win revenues had a 
significantly higher revenue growth trend and more stabilized revenues than did 
aggregate table wins.
Implications o f  the Study 
Based on the results and findings, this study offers four important implications for 
Atlantic C ity and Las Vegas Strip casinos. First, Las Vegas Strip casinos need to tightly 
control their rising costs and expenses, which have increased even faster than has growth 
o f  total revenue. Primary contributors to rapidly rising costs and expenses were the music 
& entertainm ent item and other general and administrative item: management fees; 
corporation fees; and internal maintenance fees. Rapid increases in interest expenses, and 
in depreciation and amortization also contributed to a significant decline in net income 
before income taxes and extraordinary items, while EBITDA as a  percentage o f  total 
revenue declined moderately since 1996. Las Vegas Strip casinos need to lower their
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overall costs and expenses, focusing on items o f general and administrative expense, and 
also change their em phasis from capacity expansion to custom er market expansion.
Second, Atlantic City casinos need to build more diversified revenue distributions, 
increasing their non-gaming revenue proportion, ju st as the Las Vegas Strip has 
repositioned itself as a multi-entertainment destination. For the future success o f  Atlantic 
City, casino operators need to increase their numbers o f  non-gaming entertainment 
options, and also add to the percentage o f travelers who com e by air in order to increase 
the average length o f  stay and num ber o f visitors, as opposed to a continued reliance on 
day-trippers. In addition, Atlantic C ity casinos need to decrease their interest expenses 
and promotional allowances by lowering their debt finance and changing their m arketing 
strategies to be more cost efficient.
Third, Las Vegas Strip casinos could invest more in slots, quarter slots in 
particular, in comparison with table games, because regression results showed that slots 
win revenues have a higher revenue growth trend and m ore stable revenues than do table 
games. However, since the daily win per slot on the Las Vegas Strip has been low er than 
that o f  Atlantic City, Las Vegas Strip casinos should invest in promoting slots w ith 
various m arketing strategies, rather than merely increasing the number o f  slots. In 
comparison with blackjack, baccarat has had low and unstable wins with substantial 
changes. This m ay be because most o f  baccarat players are high rollers, and casinos do 
not always win against them due to a low theoretical win o f  1.235 percent (Kilby & Fox, 
1998). Therefore, casino operators could promote blackjack games over baccarat games. 
For A tlantic City casinos, they need to invest more heavily in slots, which have a 
significantly higher revenue growth trend and much more stabilized revenues com pared
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to table games, even though slot revenues for Atlantic C ity accounted fo r m ore than 70 
percent o f  gaming revenue in 2000.
Finally, it was identified, based on com parison o f  financial perform ance o f large 
and small casinos in the two markets, that econom ies o f  scale exist in the gaming industry. 
Therefore, more active mergers and acquisitions could be considered by the gaming 
industry, since lower borrowing costs; amelioration o f  duplicative general and 
adm inistrative expenses; and purchasing economies o f  scale should be prim ary drivers o f  
earnings growth.
One o f the most beneficial aspects o f  merger and acquisition activity is “synergy 
gaining” . According to M orck, Shleifer and Vishny ( 1988), synergy gains may derive 
from increases in market power, offsetting the profits o f  one firm with tax loss carry 
forwards, thus com bining m arketing networks or sim ply eliminating functions common 
to both firms. W ithin the gam ing industry especially, a  merger and acquisition might also 
provide benefit: acquiring custom er databases from the target company. Such databases 
can help an acquiring com pany enter a new market with greater ease.
Recommendations for Future Studies
For future studies com paring casino operations o f  the Las Vegas Strip and 
Atlantic City, respectively, it is suggested that new em erging markets, such as riverboat 
gam ing and Indian reservation gam ing also be exam ined. Both o f these markets have 
increased in importance w ithin the U.S. gaming industry in terms o f  gam ing revenue. 
M errill Lynch estim ates that in 2000, riverboat gam ing won approximately S9.3 billion.
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and Indian reservation gaming won $9.9 billion while total gaming revenue for the U.S. 
as a  whole was approximately $35.1 billions for that year (Simpson, 2(X)1).
Based on examination o f such em erging markets, future studies could com pare 
casino operations o f traditional markets, such as Las Vegas and Atlantic City, w ith those 
o f em erging markets, like riverboat and Indian reservation gaming. The comparative 
analysis o f  casino operations within traditional markets with those o f  emerging gam ing 
markets would provide a more com plete picture o f the gaming industry in the United 
States.
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